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The thesis investigates reenlistment behavior of a particular occupational
sector of the U. S. Navy. The data set consists of enlisted members with nuclear
NECs and 4 to 9 years of service during the 1977-1987 time frame. Specific pay
and employment data from the civilian nuclear industry is used for comparison to
military pay. Two econometric modelling techniques are employed: logit analysis
for individual level data, and time-series cross-sectional analysis for pooled data.
The effect on reenlistment probability of changes in relative military and civilian
salaries is determined. The results demonstrate the importance of pay to the
reenlistment decisions of these men, but indicate that the supply elasticity is
relatively low. It is argued that this low responsiveness of retention to pay changes
is due not only to the arduous conditions of the work environment, but to the fact
that military to civilian pay ratios were uniformly low during the period of
observation. Previous research concerning the relationship of retention to pay has
aggregated occupational categories and found higher elasticities. This paper shows
that retention behavior can be better understood using information about
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1. Motivation for this Study
In decisions about budgeting for defense, questions of efficiency are
ubiquitous. The military services spend billions not only on tanks, ships, airplanes
and other capital assets, but also on hundreds of thousands of civilians and
uniformed personnel. This paper looks specifically at manning 1 in the Navy. It
explores policy issues related to the use of monetary resources to affect retention2
of nuclear trained personnel.
Military manning problems seem to occur in cycles, like many other
things. Some recent predictions assert that recent successful times may soon end
due to what has been called the "birth dearth" [Ref. 1]. The baby boom that
followed in the wake of World War II was a boon to military recruiters, both
directly because of the large numbers of potential enlistees in the population, and
indirectly due to the loose labor market of which they were a part. Beginning in the
early sixties birth rates declined, and the effects of this were felt in the late seventies
when these people entered the work force and became recruiting targets. During
the 1990s it is expected that there will be about 25 percent fewer nineteen-year-olds
than in 1980. [Ref. 2: p.3] Since the services will have to attract a larger
1
"Manning" is used here as a gender-neutral term. It originated in a nautical context (e.g.,
manning ships) which even today is male-dominated.
2 Retention is typically used when speaking of the decision to remain in service after successful
completion of a term of enlistment. It is not to be confused with attrition, which refers to personnel
leaving the military prior to the end of the first period of obligated service.
proportion of eligible youths to maintain present personnel strength, wage costs are
expected to rise significantly.
The total cost of labor is not made up of wages alone. There are non-wage
components such as hiring and training. These quasi-fixed labor costs are
significantly affected by the rates at which people enter and leave an organization.
The more stable the organization's membership, the less will be spent on hiring and
training. In the military there are unique non-monetary benefits of stability.
Morale and unit cohesion can be very important in a high stress combat
environment. Stability is a factor influencing esprit de corps.
The focus here will be on retention of personnel in the nuclear Navy
facing the first reenlistment opportunity. This study is not concerned with the
initial enlistment or with second and subsequent reenlistments.
The military is distinct from other employers in that members are
contracted for a certain period of service, during which time they are not normally
allowed to leave. The vast majority of hiring is at the entry level. Enlisted
personnel are mosdy unskilled when they enter, and usually 17-20 years old. Thus
a key selling point of joining the military is frequently the training that is offered.
Much of this training is often applicable to civilian jobs. Part of the retention
problems faced by the armed services has to do with the marketability of its
personnel outside the service. As expected, the most serious personnel shortages
usually exist in skilled ratings where the personnel have accumulated a high level of
training.
This thesis will attempt to describe the relationship of pay to retention in
the nuclear enlisted community.
2. Factors Influencing Retention
The intuitive relationship between pay and a person's choice of whether to
belong to an organization has been repeatedly shown to be true empirically, both by
defense-supported and independent civilian research. But the choice of where to
work is also a function of numerous other factors. Studies have found age, race,
gender, dependents and family composition, level of education, the business cycle,
unemployment and economic conditions, family tradition, and organizational
attributes such as job security, work atmosphere and culture, dispute resolution
procedures, and perception of equity to be important. The list could go on.
Usually, pay is thought to be predominant among these; perhaps because it is an
easily quantifiable variable, and certainly because it is the one factor over which the
organization's management may have the most control. Relevant findings of
previous researchers will be discussed in the next chapter.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
This study answers the following question. How well can reenlistment
decisions be explained using information about the relationship between military
salary and the salary available in a comparable civilian job? It is hypothesized that
retention behavior of specific occupational groups can be better understood by
considering their opportunities apart from those available to military members in
general. Previous work has addressed this relationship for aggregated categories
of occupations. This thesis will investigate the relationships within a particular
category and compare the results to those obtained by other studies.
C. SCOPEOFTHE THESIS
1. Boundaries
Many factors are involved in the reenlistment decision; the focus here will
be on economic incentives. An additional bound is the restriction of the analysis to
a specific occupational sector—nuclear trained enlisted men. The selection of this
group is justified by the following observations.
These men are predominantly stationed at sea on combat ships. They will
spend most of their early careers at sea. These ships are frequently undermanned,
since recent retention problems have affected the number of crew members
available for assignment to ships. Because various nuclear ship types-aircraft
carriers, cruisers, and submarines—represent a large proportion, about 25 percent,
of the Navy 1
,
their manning is of primary importance.
Nuclear trained enlisted men are above-average intellectually. Less than
35 percent of the 18 to 23-year-olds in the United States can meet the Navy's
aptitude test qualifications for nuclear training [Ref. 3]. These men are responsible
for the operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants in an atmosphere where
supervision is close, tolerance for error is practically non-existent, and pressure
and workload are high. All these characteristics contribute to the homogeneity of
this group, and distinguish it from other categories of personnel in the Navy, even
other sea-going ratings.
For over a decade the singularity of this sector has been recognized; there
have been special pays associated with nuclear training and sea-duty, and lucrative
bonuses for those who reenlist. These incentives can be thought of as compensating
1 580 ships according to the FY89 Defense Budget.
for arduous work, but have developed primarily to compensate for shortages due to
large numbers of nuclear trained personnel choosing to leave the Navy for careers
in the civilian world. As a result of the differential pay existing now, a nuclear
trained petty officer on a submarine is probably the most highly paid of his rank in
the service. 1
2. Limitations
As is the case with much social science research, the main limitation of a
study such as this is in the data. To completely describe retention behavior of any
group, it would be necessary not only to account for the inherent randomness of
human behavior in general, but also to define all the alternatives to reenlistment
precisely. This is obviously not possible. However, this study attempts to show that
refinement of data and disaggregation of occupational groups can yield improved
explanatory power.
D. ORGANIZATION
The following chapter discusses the existing state of knowledge on the subject
at hand. Chapter 3 describes the methodology of this study and Chapter 4 presents
data analysis and discusses the results in detail. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with
policy implications and recommendations.
1 A typical nuclear-trained first-class petty officer (pay grade E-6) with 6-10 years of service
earned about $28,000 in 1986. His non-nuclear-trained contemporary earned about $19,000.
n. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. OVERVIEW OF THE RETENTION ISSUE
1. The Economic Perspective
Since the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) began, attention has been focused
on ways in which the military service has changed as a result. The full import of
the transformation from a system of conscription to one in which the military
competes more fully in the free labor market is not immediately apparent. Some
subtle but important effects of this change have been documented in the
professional literature of manpower analysis.
The military has traditionally been institutional rather than occupational.
Several features of the institutional military have been listed by Charles C. Moskos,
Jr. [Ref. 4: p.42]: fixed terms of enlistment, 24-hour availability, military disci-
pline and law, inability to unionize for collective bargaining, and the existence of
non-cash forms of compensation. These characteristics align themselves well with
a concept of a civic duty to serve, which has its origin in pre-revolutionary
literature. But the institutional ideal of devoted soldiers performing in blind
obedience to superiors has eroded in the last two decades.
While the enlisted force has never been entirely comprised of conscripts,
the end of the draft brought the military more completely into competition with
other users of labor and has changed the service as a result. Moskos calls this
change "occupationalization." The attributes of the new occupationalized military
are: higher pay for recruits and the resultant increase in the number of junior
enlisted personnel who live off-base and have families, more direct compensation
(i.e., the choice to receive allowances in cash), some differentiation of pay in
consideration of skill, an increased proportion of personnel holding second jobs
and the attendant reduced level of commitment to the military, and the increasing
reliance on contract labor for some jobs. [Ref. 5: pp. 16- 17]
One effect of these changes has been increased emphasis on cost-
effectiveness. Military managers at the highest levels have begun to pay more
attention to the costs of personnel compensation. Enlisted soldiers and sailors may
have changed too, such that they are relatively more influenced by money and less
by patriotic duty than their counterparts of two decades ago. Lest it be imagined
that the government caused all this, it should be pointed out that this societal
evolution was well underway by the time the draft ended. 1 It is certainly true that
the citizen soldier concept remains important to the AVF. [Ref. 6: p.271]
Many of the studies that will be discussed in this chapter were the result of
manpower managers' efforts to learn about economic matters so as to administer
personnel resources more efficiently. This economic perspective is new to some,
but critical to those who expect success in the competitive market.
2. Theories of Organizational Participation
The problem of organizational participation has interested sociologists
and behavioral scientists for years. Organizational participation is defined here to
mean an individual's decision to become a member of an organization. Early work
by Herbert Simon introduced the idea of an equilibrium between inducements and
contributions which was to become important in the development of the literature.
[Ref. 71 In this conception, an individual will contribute labor to an organization if
In fact, it could be argued that the societal change helped to cause the end of conscription.
the value of that labor to the individual is less than the inducements the organization
is able to offer. To the extent that there is freedom to negotiate the participation
decision, this same evaluation will take place continuously. For the military
application, individuals make these judgments prior to enlisting and near the end of
the first and subsequent terms of enlistment.
A similar framework for understanding this sort of decision making is
attributed to Thibaut and Kelley. [Ref. 8] In their parlance, comparison is made
between a person's current job and the best available alternative. The worker will
remain at that job as long as the comparison level, CL, 1 associated with the present
position is greater than the CLalt associated with the best alternative. The extent and
accuracy of knowledge about alternatives is clearly important here.
For every person voluntarily in the military, it can be said that the
perceived level of inducement must have been at or above the amount required at
the time the initial enlistment decision was made. The military service must have
been perceived as the best available choice. [Ref. 9]
If we knew an individual's perception of the inducements offered by
continuing in service compared to those available elsewhere, we could easily
predict reenlistment behavior. This logic can be applied just the same whether
these inducements are believed to have monetary or non-monetary character. The
higher the monetary compensation, the less of other things is required. If pay is
low, other positive factors must be present in sufficient measure to induce
participation.
1 CL is something like the more common "utility" concept.
One attempt to explicate the decision making process that takes place in
the minds of people considering separation from an organization segregates factors
in four categories. [Ref. 10] These are:
job attributes -- the work and lifestyle,
personal and professional growth potential,
family considerations, and
finances.
This sort of framework is common. The studies of quit behavior in the
civilian context provide much of the background for work intended to be relevant
to military retention in particular. For example, a 1984 study of production
workers in a manufacturing firm models quitting in terms of expected alternative
wages, job satisfaction, and the cost of changing jobs. [Ref. 1 1 ]
For the purpose of this thesis, the more familiar division of factors into
monetary and non-monetary categories is appropriate and will be used for the
examinations of the next section.
B. THE INFLUENCE OF SPECIFIC FACTORS
1. Non-Pecuniarv Components
Job, personal, and family considerations are obviously important to an
individual making a decision about whether to remain in any organization. These
factors frequently illustrate a way in which the military service is radically
different from its competitors. Sea duty, for example, has been shown to be very
meaningful in retention decisions. One pair of researchers even called it "the major
non-pecuniary element influencing reenlistment decisions." [Ref. 12: p. 26]
Warner and Goldberg confirmed their intuition by incorporating the expected
amount of second-term sea duty into a quantitative model of first-term
9
reenlistment, and found a statistically significant negative coefficient indicating an
elasticity 1 of -0.34. [Ref. 13] The same two expanded their study a year later,
classifying Navy ratings into nine categories. They found statistically significant
negative relationships in seven of the nine, the central tendency being such that a ten
percentage point increase in the incidence of sea-duty decreases first-term
reenlistment rate by 1.6 percentage points. [Ref. 14]
People also behave differently depending upon their marital and family
status. Strangely, the empirical findings here conflict. One study reviewed the
results of previous work and concluded that "the preponderance of evidence is that
marriage and children tend to increase the probability of voluntary termination
from military service." [Ref. 15: p.58] The reason has to do presumably with the
issues of family separation and frequent transfers. The opposite result has been
presented by others, however. Work by Chow and Polich based on data from the
1976 Department of Defense Personnel Survey found that reenlistment rates in
grades E-3, E-4, and E-5 were consistently higher, by an average of about 50
percent, for those with one or more dependents. [Ref. 16: p.9] Warner and
Goldberg postulate that the value of military medical and other benefits is greater
to married individuals, and show in their regression model that they are more
likely than single members to reenlist. [Ref. 13: p. 19] Job stability and security
may also play a part. [Ref. 17]
Cultural elements have been largely neglected. An obvious reason is the
fact that they are practically impossible to measure quantitatively. But family
1 Elasticity is defined as the ratio of percentage changes. Here, -0.34 is the ratio of
%Areenlistment/%Asea-duty.
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tradition may be very important [Ref. 6]. For instance, Singer and Morton found
that retention was higher among personnel who had entered the military from a
state other than their birthplace [Ref. 18]. Perhaps such individuals are more
accepting not only of moving, but also of being away from family and living a
relatively risky life in general.
In the literature on retention and quit behavior, discussions of job
satisfaction are ubiquitous. Not surprisingly, there is a clear correlation between
job satisfaction and quit behavior [Refs. 19, 20, and 21]. The factors that
contribute to job satisfaction are the same as those previously claimed to influence
quit behavior: pay, working conditions, job security, advancement opportunities,
dispute resolution mechanisms, and psychological rewards. [Ref. 15: p.35-36]
In the case of the Navy, there are unique rewards. Being able to play with
some of the world's most expensive and exotic toys is important for some. Oppor-
tunities for travel, possibilities of exciting work, and camaraderie with shipmates
are important for many. The responsibility that the military requires its members
to take at early stages in their careers is largely unmatched in the private sector.
Imagine a nineteen year old man at the reactor control panel on a nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier. The training provided by the military is important for almost
everyone. People join the armed services for these and many other reasons. Surely
these same reasons must also be important when people decide whether to stay.
2. Material Components
a. Early Findings
It is widely accepted as well as plausible that organizational
participation decisions are influenced mightily by money and by other tangible
rewards. Not so predictably, the effects of pay on retention are sometimes
11
complicated. The first complication is the military pay system itself. Because the
structure and rules are extraordinarily complex, it is difficult to compare military
pay with that of civilian jobs. There are bonuses and special pays associated with
sea duty, submarine and flight duty, etc. There are non-taxable allowances for
subsistence and quarters if not provided in kind. And medical, dental, and
retirement benefits should be included, but are difficult to express in monetary
value terms.
There was concern with the relationship of pay to enlistment during
the draft era, since not all soldiers and sailors were draftees. Conscription was
meant to supply only recruits, not career servicemen. But the situation was
different then, since response to pay depended upon the form and magnitude of the
draft. One of the first all-volunteer era studies looked at the effects of variable
reenlistment bonuses on reenlistment. [Ref. 221 In this study, Kleinman and
Shughart followed the path established by earlier work, modeling an individual's
decision about continuing military service as a comparison between the present
values of expected military earnings and expected earnings as a civilian.
Accounting for discounted present-value is important, because
discount rates for young people of military age have been consistently estimated at
above 1 5 percent. Some researchers have arrived at estimates as high as 30 percent
[Refs. 23 and 24]. The monetary value of salary is therefore expected to be much
more meaningful to young people than retirement and other benefits which accrue
in the future. When older career members are considered, the present value of the
legendary military pension is large.
Using data from 1965-1972, Kleinman and Shughart employed linear
probability and logit models relating military wages and bonuses to reenlistment
12
rates. Bonuses are variable since the bonus amount is the product of monthly basic
pay, period of the new enlistment contract, and the bonus multiple established by
the Navy. In this study the multiples range from zero to four. Parameter estimates
and bonus elasticities are presented in Table 1
.
Table 1
ESTIMATES OF BONUS ELASTICITIES, 1965-1972
(Approximate t-statistic)
Linear Model Logi t Model
















SOURCE: Reference 22: p. 14
* a is the parameter estimate associated with the present value of military pay variable.
Kleinman and Shughart conclude that a $1000 increase in the bonus
will lead to an average increase in reenlistment rate of 1.4 percentage points. An
increase by one in the bonus multiple will lead to an average of 0.6 more years of
service commitment per affected individual.
The end of conscription presented an opportunity for experimenta-
tion. Accompanying the advent of the all-volunteer military was a dramatic
increase in pay of junior enlisted personnel effective November, 1971. It ranged
from a 32 percent increase for an E-3 to a 9 percent increase for an E-5. Haber and
Stewart computed military to civilian wage differentials during the period 1971-
13
72. [Ref. 25] They determined pay elasticities as shown in Table 2. Note that there
were significant differences between ratings where personnel could earn a Variable
Reenlistment Bonus (VRB) and those where they could not.
Table 2
ESTIMATES OF PAY ELASTICITIES, 1971-1972
Ratings with no VRBC Ratings with VRB
E-3 E-4 E-5 E-3 E-4 E-5
Craftsmen 4.49 3.10 3.50 2.95 3.30 1.93
Clerical 4.53 7.16 1.19 b 2.62 -4.47
Service a -1.07 0.74 b b b
Miscellaneous 3.17 1.90 1.58 4.48 3.23 1.94
SOURCE: Reference 25: p. 13
a fewer than 100 observations.
b no eligible ratings in this category
c VRB was the forerunner to the present Selective Reenlistment Bonus system.
An important aspect omitted by these two studies is the effect of
availability or non-availability of civilian jobs on quit behavior. Military pay and
bonuses might be less important when economic conditions outside are poor; if
civilian jobs are plentiful, however, military pay comparability will be more
important. As just one example, Lippman and McCall found that quit rates in
manufacturing were strongly related to the "business cycle." In the civilian sector,
they detected more quits and job volatility in better times. [Ref. 26] Of course,
enlisted men's ability to respond to such fluctuations is limited.
A 1977 study by Enns used cross-sectional data from fiscal years
1971-74 and modelled the reenlistment rate as a function of pay and bonuses,
controlling for demographics such as race, education level, mental aptitude, entry
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age and dependents. [Ref. 27] He found pay elasticities of 2.10 (Army), 2.58
(Navy) and 3.40 (Air Force). Using only Army data, and assuming installment
bonus payments, he estimated the bonus elasticity at 2.0. Enns attempted to show
the existence of occupational differences, but was not able to do so with sufficient
statistical confidence.
Among the first to consider unemployment quantitatively were
Cohen and Reedy. [Ref. 28] In addition to using the national average rate for 20-24
year olds and for the population in general, this study used various lagged values as
well as rates by geographic region. The results showed dynamics to be important—
a rapidly changing unemployment rate had a different effect than a stable situation
at the same rate. If the unemployment rate has recently decreased to a current
relatively low value, for example, they found that reenlistment rate would be
higher, as if the unemployment rate were still at a high level. Additionally, they
found indications that the amount of doubt about the future, higher at moderate
unemployment rates, makes a difference. Apparently when unemployment is at a
high level, for example, people believe it will decrease. The longer it stays high,
the greater the confidence that it will soon be lower.
Occupational differences were apparent in this data. While the
occupationally differentiated unemployment rates did not perform better than
aggregates, some occupational categories were more affected by the aggregated
rates than others. The most sensitive was the electrical and electronics category.
A 1979 effort by Warner and Simon used post-draft data exclusively,
attempting to determine the effects of pay on both first and second-term retention
decisions. [Ref. 29] They separated Navy ratings into sixteen occupational areas.
15
The Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model, developed by Warner, was used. 1
This model predicts reenlistment based upon An , the maximum annualized cost of
leaving. For example, suppose a person believes he could make $80,000 in today's
dollars over the next four years in a civilian job. If his expected military pay is
valued at $90,000 he has a total present value cost of leaving of $10,000. He will
reenlist only if his taste for civilian life (-y), which can include many things, exceeds
this $10,000 monetary cost of leaving. The retention rate should be the proportion
of people for whom -y is greater than An .
With this formulation, we can make predictions about reenlistment.
It is perhaps more convenient to assume that civilian earnings exceed military
earnings, so that the cost of leaving An is negative. Thus a more appropriate
expression for the reenlistment probability is r = Pr(y>-A n). If An is calculated,
then the expected value of r can be determined by assuming a probability
distribution for y. The time horizon is key in the application of this model. An




, T. Only one of these needs to exceed the taste for civilian life y in order
for the individual to benefit from staying.
In the study by Warner and Simon, a normal distribution of y is
assumed and the probit specification results. The analysis was able to demonstrate a
strong positive relationship between reenlistment and military pay. In addition,
there were occupational group differences. The parameter estimates were highest
for white-collar ratings and for those where working conditions in the Navy are
not drastically different from comparable jobs in the civilian sector. The ratings
1 The following discussion of the model closely parallels that in reference 1 1.
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which have the most arduous working conditions had the lowest parameter
estimates, meaning they are least responsive to pay changes. Pay elasticities found
by this study range from about 1.0 to 3.0. An increase in the bonus multiple by one
was found to result in a 2 to 5 percentage point improvement in reenlistment rate.
An interesting complication is introduced by these authors. It is likely that first-
term reenlistment bonuses will decrease the average value of y in the second term
population due to self selection. Therefore, the second-term reenlistment rate will
suffer in comparison to what it would have been if there were no first-term bonus.
b. Recent Findings
In 1976 the Department of Defense conducted an exhaustive survey
of officers and enlisted personnel. Retention was a principal issue. In 1980, Chow
and Polich matched actual reenlistment outcomes of survey respondents using
social security numbers provided by Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) to
allow estimation of models of reenlistment intention and behavior. [Ref. 16] They
used a logit specification and confirmed the importance of pay and reenlistment
bonuses. Interestingly, they also uncovered consistent underestimation of total
military compensation by members. This misperception ranged from 62 percent to
90 percent of actual RMC. 1 The difference between actual and perceived RMC
was found to be negatively related to reenlistment in a significant way, i.e., the
larger the difference, the lower the reenlistment probability.
In 1981 the first of several important studies by John Warner and
Matthew Goldberg was published [Ref. 12]. Its purpose was to determine the effect
1 Regular Military Compensation is basic pay plus allowances plus the tax advantage of allowances.
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of sea-duty on reenlistment rate using the ACOL framework. Occupations were
segregated into sixteen categories to allow for variation in sea duty [Ref. 29]. They
used time series data from fiscal years 1974-78 and found pay elasticities on the
order of 2.0, confirming previous results.
Goldberg and Warner followed this effort in 1982 with what might
be called a landmark publication. [Ref. 13] This was the first study to consider
extension as a third option to reenlistment and separation from the service. It was
also the first to effectively model the retention decision incorporating all of the
significant variables: pay, bonuses, and civilian sector economic conditions. In this
work, the sixteen occupational categories were reduced to 9. Using data from 1974
to 1980, they employed a utility maximization framework where the utilities of
reenlistment, extension, and leaving the service, respectively, are:
Vr=Mr + ccrZ + ur
Vg = Me + oceZ + ue
Vl = C + olZ + ul
where M = annualized military pay over the appropriate time
horizon
C = annualized civilian pay
aZ = vector of monetary value of "taste" factors
u = random error terms
Note that for reenlistment the value ofM will include whatever bonus
amount applies, while those extending do not earn a bonus. This construction leads
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to a logit model specified by the following two log-odds equations expressing
probabilities of reenlistment, extension, and leaving.
In (Pe/Pl) = (Pe " Pl) + (Oe - Ol) Z + p(ME - C) + E l
In (Pr/Pl) = (Pr - pL) + (ccr - «l) Z + p(MR - C) + ^
This study included as explanatory variables the unemployment rate,
demographic dummies, and the expected amount of second term sea-duty. Pay,
unemployment, and sea-duty parameter estimates are presented in Table 3.
Table 3
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR PAY, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND SEA-DUTY




Mf - C U rate Sea-dutv
Non-elecr3 .000183 -0.105 0.393
Electronics .000205 0.065 0.414
Administrative .000239 -1.33 -1.732
Reenlistment Pay
Mr - C U rate Sea-dutv Elasticity
.000183 0.213 -1.794 1.89
.000205 0.392 -1.121 2.02
.000239 0.150 -3.426 1.78
SOURCE: Reference 13
a technical non-electronic ratings, most of which are seagoing.
Goldberg expanded upon this work in 1985 with the benefit of more
data, from fiscal years 1977-84. [Ref. 30] This study used the same logit model as
the 1 982 effort, but took advantage of the greater variations in unemployment rate
that occurred in the early eighties. This time a 10 percent discount rate was
assumed. Controlling for race and education, he used the generalized least squares
regression technique to estimate the parameters associated with pay and unemploy-
ment variables. These parameters were all found to be positive and statistically
significant. Pay elasticities were, in general, three to five times as large as
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unemployment elasticities; implying that a 10 percent decrease in the
unemployment rate can be offset by a 2 to 4 percent increase in military pay. The
elasticities of total retention rate with respect to pay alone were on the order of 2.0
for all rating categories, as had been previously determined. Goldberg concludes
with the following comment:
While unemployment is an important determinant of retention, it
is of only secondary importance when compared to military pay.
Military pay can be used not only to offset changes in unemployment
from year to year, but also to control differences in retention rates
across ratings through reenlistment bonuses. Flexible, targeted pays
such as reenlistment bonuses are the Navy's most potent tool for
controlling retention rates. [Ref. 30: p. 10]
Two other works followed in the footsteps of Warner and Goldberg.
These were done in 1985 by Hosek and Peterson [Ref. 31] and in 1987 by Cymrot
[Ref. 32]. The first of these focused on bonuses and performed a comparison of
lump-sum and installment payment methods, facilitated by the policy change in
1979 which replaced installment by lump-sum payments. They also succeeded in
accounting for extension as a decision distinct from reenlistment or separation.
Lump-sum bonuses were shown to be more effective in increasing reenlistment. In
addition, bonuses were shown to be preferable to general pay increases to combat
the effect on retention of lowering civilian unemployment. Tables 4 and 5 below
demonstrate this point using their model estimates to forecast response of personnel
to assumed changes in unemployment from 10 to 8 percent.
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Table 4






Reenlistment 17 14 15
Extension 10 11 12
Retention 27 25 27
SOURCE: Reference 31
Table 5



















a In 1976 dollars.
These tables show that while both pay increases and bonus increases
can recover the original 27 percent retention rate, the pay increase does so by
increasing extensions at the expense of reenlistments. This result is even more
pronounced at the second term. The explanation is that during poor economic
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conditions, many people simply extend to wait for things to get better. The impact
of this difference on total obligated manyears is clear.
Cymrot's research looked at the Marine Corps' SRB program. He
used logit ACOL and reconfirmed the significance of pay, bonuses, and
unemployment. The bonus was again determined to be the most important of
factors.
As the use of targeted bonuses has become prevalent, attention has
been drawn to the irrationality of the military pay system. The case was made as
early as 1981 for a differently managed pay system which would establish
compensation based on skill and duties. [Ref. 331 Recognizing that the present
system pays people differentially by skill through the use of bonuses, Binkin asserts
that what is good by evolution would be better by design. He presents a strong
argument for eliminating the traditional linkage between pay and rank. Although
this is a somewhat extreme view, it highlights the importance of bonuses one of the
only flexible aspects of the present military pay structure.
C. SUMMARY
Economic theory indicates that if participation is a function of pay, shortages
will develop where pay is insufficient. Given the relatively invariant military pay
scales, retention problems should therefore occur among those personnel where
alternatives to the Navy are most attractive. This is the reason for the attention here
to personnel in high skill occupations doing jobs which are the most arduous. It is
likely that these people will have the most to gain by leaving the service since they
can command better wages in the private sector than their less skilled counterparts.
Similarly, for demanding assignments, less monetary difference between the
military and the nearest civilian alternative is necessary to induce a person to quit.
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Targeted bonuses for reenlistment, as well as sea-pay and other special duty pays,
mitigate this differential but do not eliminate it completely.
Several of the studies cited confirm that significant differences exist in the
behavior of various occupational groups in the military. The basis for the
explorations of the following section is the expectation that different groups of
people should respond differently to civilian labor market factors, including pay
comparability, depending upon the applicability of their skills to civilian firms.
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m. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. THE DATA
1. Sources
Two types of data are needed to conduct the desired analysis: first,
information about military pay, civilian pay, and economic conditions; second,
information about the actual behavior of nuclear-trained enlisted men.
The first is available largely from public sources. Navy Times publishes
military pay tables every year when raises are enacted by Congress. These include
basic pay and basic allowances for quarters and subsistence. Other elements of
military compensation present more of a problem. Sea pay and selective
reenlistment bonus (SRB) multiples for the time period 1975-1984 were obtained
from sources at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). More recent SRB multiples
were obtained from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP131 and
OP 136); sea pay rates were taken from the Uniformed Services Almanac,
Economic variables such as unemployment rates and average weekly earnings were
extracted from monthly publications of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Organization Resources Counselors, Inc. (ORC) was able to provide
crucial information concerning employment and wages from its annual surveys of
the civilian nuclear industry. The average monthly salaries, based upon 40 hours
per week, and the total number of positions were reported for 9 occupational
categories. Not only are these categories comparable to nuclear Navy occupations,
they are also predominantly filled by nuclear Navy veterans. These data were
available from 1977 to the present.
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Finally, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) constructed tapes
from their enlisted master file for all members having the relevant Navy Enlisted
Classifications (NECs) with years of service between 4 and 9 years; records were
extracted annually as of 30 September from 1975 to 1987. (See Table 6.)
The method to be employed in this thesis is based on examination every
September of the members who have less than about 13 months remaining in their
enlistment contract. Screening of the following year's file allows determination of
the retention choice made by each of these members. If they are still in the Navy,
they will appear in the next year's data file with a new date of contract expiration.
If they do not appear, it can be inferred that they chose not to continue in the service
and were separated from the Navy.
Table 6
DESCRIPTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF NECSa
NEC Corresponding Rating Supervisory^ Percent
3353 Electrician's Mate (EM) No 17.9
3354 Electronics Technician (ET) No 21.9
3355 Machinist's Mate (MM) No 21.9
3356 Machinist's Mate (ELT)C No 12.0
3363 Electrician's Mate Yes 6.1
3364 Electronics Technician Yes 7.7
3365 Machinist's Mate Yes 7.6
3366 Machinist's Mate (ELT) Yes 4.9
a During part of this period, there were also some Interior Communications Electricians (ICs) in the
nuclear field, performing the same jobs as Electrician's Mates. Exclusion of the 2 NECs
corresponding to nuclear trained ICs was an oversight by the author.
b The supervisory NEC is assigned to personnel E-6 and above with over 6 years of service and
Commanding Officer's recommendation. Accompanying this designation are supervisory watch
duties and proficiency pay. SRB multiples are also frequendy higher for those with the
supervisory NEC.
c Engineering Laboratory Technicians (ELTs) receive training in chemical and radiological controls
in addition to the normal nuclear Machinist's Mate training.
25
2. Selective Reenlistment Bonuses
Retention problems in this sector of the Navy are well-known. One
attempt to increase reenlistments is the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB)
program. Members who reenlist for three or more years are eligible for a cash
bonus equal to their monthly basic pay multiplied by the product of the number of
years obligated and a multiple based upon their NEC. Table 7 shows the high SRB
multiples that have existed almost since the program's inception. In addition, the
program consists of two statutory caps, one on the total amount of each bonus, and
another lower cap that can be exceeded by only 10 percent of the bonuses paid.
Nuclear trained personnel have consistently taken up a majority of the 10 percent
that can be above the lower cap.
Table 7





Zone B^ 90% Cap Absolute Cap
1976-80 6.0 6.0 $15,000 $15,000
1981 6.0 6.0 $16,000 $20,000
1982-83 5.0 6.0 $16,000 $20,000
1984 5.0 4.8 $16,000 $20,000
1985 4.5 4.5 $20,000 $30,000
1986 4.0 5.0 $20,000 $30,000
1987 4.0 5.0 $20,000 $30,000
a When multiples differed among NECs table entries are weighted averages.
b Zone A is for reenlistments prior to the sixth year of service. Zone B is from six to ten years of
service.
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SRB rates or multiples have been used as explanatory variables in
reenlistment formulations of previous studies. There are simultaneity problems
with this approach, since multiples are determined to some extent by personnel
shortages. Thus retention rates are a factor as well. For this sector of the Navy,
there is little variation in the multiples so the bonus is not used explicitly in any
model. Bonuses will be incorporated in calculations of military pay. Since
multiples are so high, the caps are significant. Figure 1 shows the effect of the
statutory cap on a hypothetical 48 month reenlistment of a second-class petty
officer (pay grade E-5) with six to eight years of service. The figure shows the
bonus amounts that such an individual could have earned for a 4 year reenlistment
had there been no cap. For most of the period covered, such an individual would
not have received that amount due to the cap. Until the cap increased to $30,000 in
1985 there was no incentive to reenlist for as much as 48 months, since the cap
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Figure 1. The Effect ofSRB Caps
Figure 2 shows how the number of months necessary to reach the cap
declines as basic pay increases, and how the average amount of contracted service
increases when the cap is raised. For the first few years, the number of months for
which a member had to reenlist to reach the cap decreased. During this period the
multiples were constant and basic pay was rising slowly. After 1981, changes in the
cap, dramatic changes in basic pay, and changes in multiples caused erratic
variation in months required to reach the cap. Through 1984 the average length of
a reenlistment contract was about equal to the length required to reach the cap,
indicating that there were very few, if any, contracts for greater than this amount
of time. This is clear because a person must reenlist for at least three years in order
to qualify for an SRB.
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After the cap was raised to $30,000 in 1985, the contract length required
to reach the cap increased substantially. The average reenlistment also increased,
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Figure 2. Months to Maximize SRB and Months Obligated per Reenlistment
At times, usually at the end of a fiscal year, and sometimes at the
beginning if there is a delay in enactment of the Defense Appropriation, the SRB
program has been unfunded. These gaps in coverage have never lasted long, so
there is probably no effect on reenlistment behavior. There is probably a signifi-
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cant effect on extensions, however. Personnel who desire to reenlist while the
program is unfunded will extend for a short period of time until they can receive an
SRB.
3. Data Set Construction
The data for this thesis consists of two components. The first of these is
the economic and pay data. Thirteen observations of all the variables assembled
were read into a file, one per year for 1975-1987 inclusive. A reference date of 30
September was chosen to correspond to the date of sampling of the DMDC enlisted
master file. BLS data from the September issues of Employment and Earnings
(August estimates) were used, along with March issues for possible lagging of
unemployment rates as Cohen and Reedy have done [Ref. 28]. ORC survey data for
19xx was used for the September 19xx entry, since the survey is representative of
pay existing during the calendar year of its date. It is therefore represents the
civilian pay alternatives of those who are candidates in the 19xx data file.
This methodology is counter to the ACOL concept, introduced in chapter
two. Rather than assuming forward thinking behavior, it is proposed here that pay
comparisons made during the year before the reenlistment decision is required are
more relevant. If a member must make a choice about continuing in service a year
from now, he will investigate the job market now, and make his decision well
before the actual expiration date of his contract. Rather than evaluating present
value of future earnings, it is assumed that the member only considers current
conditions. It is plausible that the best estimate of pay in the near future is pay
today.
Military basic pay, allowances, and SRB multiples used in the 19xx file
were those in effect during the 19xx fiscal year. This produces direct compar-
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ability to the civilian pay data described above. Next year's pay is typically only a
marginal increase from this year's pay and the increases being considered by
Congress are widely known during the summer while budget bills are being
debated. Members expect future earnings comparisons to be roughly equivalent to
today's comparisons.
SRB multiples also typically undergo only marginal changes. And for the
group considered here, SRB multiples were consistently at the maximum until the
last few periods of observation.
The second component making up the data set came from Defense
Manpower Data Center. The DMDC data was segregated into thirteen files, one for
each year of observation. Members with a date of contract expiration (ETS)
greater than 13 months from 30 September were deleted. Thirteen months was
chosen to correspond roughly to an annual cycle, while allowing the inclusion of
choices made in advance of the actual date of contract expiration. The choice of a
time frame is a tradeoff. If a shorter time period is chosen, then non-candidates
will reenlist and not be counted. If a longer time period is chosen, then some will
be included who do not make a decision, falsely reducing the calculated rates.
Each of these candidate files was merged with the entire file from the
subsequent year by matching social security numbers, creating a new file for each
of 12 years. These matched files allowed analysis of retention behavior of the
candidates. If a candidate appeared in the following year's file with the same date
of contract expiration (NETS=ETS) ! , then either the member had not made a
reenlistment choice, or whatever choice he made had not been entered into
NETS is the value of ETS for a member in the second year's file.
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DMDCs file by 30 September of that year. Because their decisions could not be
determined readily, these members were deleted from further consideration,
leaving a net number of observations for that year. See Table 8. There is no reason
to believe that these people behave differently than those in the sample.
Reenlistments frequently occur several months early, while those who
choose to separate will reveal their choice on the ETS date. The method used here
is slightly flawed in that it will not detect some who reenlist early. For example, if
a member's ETS date is in November of the second year of a pair and he reenlists in
August, he will not be in the candidate data set of either year and his choice will not
be counted.
In addition, many nuclear trained men enter the Navy with a four or six
year term that is extended automatically by two years when they finish nuclear
propulsion training. It will appear by the construction of the candidate variable
that these men have a reenlistment choice to make, while they actually do not. This
problem was solved as follows. If a candidate appeared in the second year of the
pair with an ETS date exactly two years from the old ETS date, that member was
deleted from the candidate set. Some actual voluntary two-year extensions may
have been deleted improperly. There are only a very few observations of NETS-
ETS that exceed two years, though, so the number of lost observations should be




NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS EM DMDC CANDIDATE DATA SETS
Year Number ETS = NETS Net Auto ext's True candidates
1976 1164 89 1075 2 1073
1977 1317 91 1226 1 1225
1978 1155 84 1071 48 1023
1979 1089 31 1058 81 977
1980 1176 100 1076 80 996
1981 1118 127 991 127 864
1982 1378 152 1226 133 1093
1983 1255 33 1222 131 1091
1984 1277 145 1132 104 1028
1985 1418 119 1299 95 1204
1986 1501 152 1349 91 1258
TOTAL 13848 1123 12725 893 11832*
a. There were two cases of missing data, reducing the actual sample size to 1 1830 observations.
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4. Characteristics of the Cohorts





SSN Social Security Number, used to match members of
subsequent annual files
TAFMS Total active federal military service (months)
ED Education level
AFQT Armed Forces Qualification Test score
PYGD Pay grade
RACE Race (white, non-white)
STAT Marital status
DEP Number of dependents
MCAT Mental category (based upon AFQT score)
AGE Age at entry into service
PNEC Primary NEC
ETS Expiration of present enlistment contract
DOR Date of present rank
DOLE Date of latest enlistment
HOR Home of record
A number of remarks can be made concerning trends revealed by the
DMDC data sets. Some of these confirm findings of previous researchers, while
some draw attention to ways in which these men differ from the average sailor.
First, by the available measures, these men are among the smartest
enlisted personnel in the Navy. Half of them scored in the 80th percentile or above
on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) upon entry into the service. This
significantly exceeds, for example, that of the average Navy enlistee in fiscal year
1986 who scored in the 59.7 th percentile [Ref.34]. Practically all are at least high
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school graduates, and a significant number have some college experience. In 1975,
7.6 percent of the 3767 men in the 30 September file had completed at least one
year of college. By 1987, this increased to almost 10 percent.
The average candidate is about 24.5 years old. Over 95 percent are white,
and about 60 percent are married. The seniority distribution changed noticeably
over the 13 years. The "aging" of the force, which has been discussed in popular
literature, is illustrated by these data. The median time in service grew from 61
months in 1975 to 69 months in 1987, an increase of over 10 percent.
B. METHODOLOGY
1. Models
The data is arranged in two forms, called model A and model B. Model A
is an individual level model consisting of the 1 1830 candidates. For each member,
the choice of reenlistment, extension, or separation is known. This will be the
dependent variable for the econometric analysis of the next chapter. Model B
follows the methodology used by Goldberg and Warner [Ref. 13] and Hosek and
Peterson [Ref. 31]. It consists of 44 cells: 4 NEC categories by 11 fiscal years,
1977-1987. For each cell a reenlistment rate and an extension rate are calculated
and used as dependent variables for analysis. Originally it was intended to include
two additional categories, separating people either by length of service or using the
supervisory NEC, since reenlistment rates for those past the six year point should
be significantly different than for those in the first term. This would have
increased the number of observations to 88, but was found to be impractical. The
small cell sizes that resulted in a few cases produced unreliable reenlistment and
extension rates.
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2. Calculation of Reenlistment and Retention Rates
Reenlistment for both models is defined as an increase in obligated service
over the previous ETS date of greater than three years. Those who contracted for
shorter amounts of additional obligated service are considered extenders. The
three year period was chosen to correspond to the length of service commitment
required to earn a reenlistment bonus.
The data analysis was done on the mainframe computer at the Naval
Postgraduate School using SAS programming. The reader can refer to Appendix
A for program steps used to set up and analyze the data.
Reenlistment rates for this group are relatively low for the entire period
of the analysis. Tables 10 and 11 show the findings of this study and provides
comparisons with two reports published by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)
using similar methodology. Figure 3 depicts reenlistment rates graphically. The




Comparison to CNA Studies
December 82^ July 85^
Fiscal Year Reenlistment Rate (ED (MM.EM) All Ratings
1977 9.4% 16% 22% 19.6%
1978 7.1 16 19 17.4
1979 8.0 11 15 14.4














Comparison to CNA Studies
December 82^ July 85&
Fiscal Year Reenlistment Rate (ED (MM.EIVD All Ratines
1977 2.5% 8% 7% 7.9%
1978 1.6 8 7 8.7
1979 6.6 10 10 10.5
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Figure 3. Reenlistment Rates, 1977-1987
Reenlistment is more important than extension for Navy retention.
Extensions are usually short term, averaging about six months, while reenlistments
obligate the member for significantly longer periods of time. Once a member is
retained to about the ten year point, retirement benefits available at twenty years of
service become very important. Retention is not so much of a problem after that.
In addition to being relatively inconsequential to turnover costs, extensions can be
caused by many things. They are seasonal, since many people prefer to change jobs
during the summer months. Decisions to extend can be related to a ship's operating
schedule and family considerations, and even to reenlistment considerations. Some
people extend because they are considering reenlistment; some extend because they
aren't, and want to wait for a good civilian job before separating from the service.
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Perhaps a man who is expecting a promotion will extend so that he can earn a larger
bonus by reenlisting after the promotion. Partially because of these complications,
this thesis focuses on reenlistment.
3. Calculation of Military and Civilian Pav
Some assumptions are needed to allow convenient estimation of the pay
calculations these members are presumed to make. These are discussed in the next
two sections.
cu Model A, Pooled Individual Data
The military basic pay system establishes salary by rank and time in
service. Three categories of basic pay are used for this thesis: E-5 with over six
years of service, E-6 with over six years of service, and E-6 with over eight years
of service. Since well over 90% of the members with between 6 and 8 years of
service are E-5 and E-6, this split into three categories is deemed appropriate.
These are predominantly the men making reenlistment decisions. All candidates
earning less than or equal to an E-5 with over six years of service are assigned a
value of basic pay as if they were E-5 over six. Those few who earn more than an
E-6 over eight are assigned a value of basic pay as if they were E-6 over eight. Less
than five percent of the candidates had to be assigned improper pay values in this
fashion. Values for Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) are assigned in the same
way. Values for sea pay are assigned based on pay grade and on an estimate of time
at sea equal to years of service minus two. This is because a typical nuclear trained
man probably has at least 18 months of total service by the time he reports to a ship.
A member's potential SRB is calculated based upon his basic pay and the current
multiple. Due to the proximity to the statutory SRB cap, only a three year
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reenlistment is assumed. Prorating the SRB amount over the 36 month term of
reenlistment 1 , the total military pay of each member is defined as:
MILPAY = BASEPAY + BAQ + SEAPAY + SRB/36
Inclusion of BAQ will lead to overestimation of military pay for
some members who do not receive that allowance. There is also an allowance for
subsistence (BAS) and a variable housing allowance (VHA) in some areas which
some members receive. In general, military pay is probably underestimated for
married personnel, and overestimated for single personnel due to these
simplifications. Omission of submarine pay and proficiency pay will also lead to
underestimation of military pay in some cases. The data did not provide a method
of segregating the submarine-qualified personnel from those assigned to surface
ships.
Pay in the civilian nuclear industry depends upon occupation. Nine
civilian nuclear occupations are closely comparable to those in the nuclear Navy
and are predominantly filled by Navy veterans. The occupations and their
descriptions are contained in Table 12.
1 The method of SRB payment varied over the period covered by this research. Until April
1979 it was paid in equal annual installments. Lump sum payments were from that date until
January 1982, when the present system was adopted. Now the member receives 50% at
reenlistment and the remainder in annual installments. The calculation above was used regardless of
the method in effect at the time, which amounts to assuming a zero discount rate. Although this
approach is not vary satisfactory from an analytical standpoint, it greatly simplified the calculations.
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Table 12
COMPARABLE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY OCCUPATIONS
Code Title Filled Bv
E331 Control Operator ET, EM
E334 Auxiliary Equipment Operator MM
E343 Health Physicist ELT
E346 Chemical and Radiation Control Supervisor ELT
E349 Chemical Technician ELT
E352 Radiation Control Technician ELT




Not all of these are strictly entry level positions, particularly the
control operator and C/RC supervisor. However, these are positions that a nuclear
Navy veteran can reasonably be expected to fill after a relatively short period of
training and time on the job.
The expected civilian pay of a member is calculated as the weighted
average monthly pay of the occupations for which he qualifies. Weights are
assigned based on the number of positions reported for each occupation in the year.
Assumptions had to be made here. First, for the last several years a premium has
been paid to control operators when they earn a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
license. Data on the amount of this premium is available only since 1981. Since
that time, the average premium has fluctuated from about 8 percent of monthly pay
to about 12 percent, with a generally increasing trend. Most of this change is due to
the increasing prevalence of companies offering the premium. To simplify the
calculations required for this study, a premium of 10 percent is assumed for the
entire time period.
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The second assumption concerns the number of hours worked. The
average monthly salary reported is based upon a 40 hour week. In this industry,
substantial overtime hours almost always prevail. It is most common among
watchstanders (E331 in particular) but occurs in practically all occupations. The
amount of overtime increases during some phases of construction and during
shutdowns. Based on data from a single company, overtime is assumed to augment
average monthly salary by factors of 1.3 for MMs, 1.4 for EMs and ELTs, and 1.5
for ETs.
Ratios of military to civilian pay calculated by this method have a
mean of 0.515 and a standard deviation of 0.082, and range from a minimum of
0.369 to a maximum of 0.762. Sensitivity of the results to these assumptions is
evaluated in the next chapter.
b. Model B, Grouped Data
Since the civilian pay data varies only by occupation and time, the
grouped data model can draw on the same calculation methods described for the
first model. But each cell will contain military members with different ranks and
years of service. Due to this problem, basic pay, BAQ, and SRB multiples for this
model are calculated using a weighted averaging technique. There was some
variation in rank and years of service distributions during this time period. On
average, about 63 percent of all candidates have less than 6 years of service. The 63
percent figure was used to weight the SRB multiple using zone A and zone B
multiples. It was also used, along with the fact that about 79 percent of those under
6 years of service were E-5s, to calculate a weighted average of basic pay and BAQ.
Separate weighting could have been applied to each cell, but was not done in the
interest of simplicity. This method does not amount to a large problem. For
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example, the weighted average never differs from the highest and lowest possible
salaries by more than about $80.
Weighted average pay ratios determined by these calculations are
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Wage growth in the nuclear industry clearly outpaced military pay
increases. Except for fiscal years 1980 and 1981, when large military pay
increases reduced the gap, and 1987, when a slackening of the increase in the
























Clearly, the upcoming analysis depends heavily on the presumption that the
civilian jobs for which data has been gathered are relevant to the military members
under consideration. This linkage is justified in two ways. First, there is evidence
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that a significant proportion of nuclear trained men do consider civilian nuclear
employment seriously. A survey of submarine career counselors found that about
38 percent of those leaving the Navy whose post-service intentions were known
either had jobs in the nuclear industry or would be looking there for employment
[Ref 36]. Second, a large proportion of employees of civilian nuclear utilities are
Navy veterans.
Both civilian and Navy nuclear plants operate under the same basic principles
to produce steam for electrical power generation and propulsion. They have
similar organizations during operation, with operators manning control stations at
key locations in the plant. Long hours are common in both occupations. Civilian
employees are able to specialize to a larger extent than is possible on a Navy ship or
submarine where manning is limited by space considerations. But all things
considered, the similarities far outnumber the differences.
The next chapter will undertake quantitative analysis which will test the degree




Two types of quantitative analysis are performed. The first method looks at
individual decisions. A logit model is used, with each of the individuals in the
candidate data sets being assigned a 1 or value for each of three variables:
REENLIST, EXT (for "extend") and SEP (for "separate"). The data set was
constructed as described in the previous chapter so that these are mutually exclusive
categories. The software available for performing the iterative maximum
likelihood technique required for estimating logit parameters does not incorporate
a multiple choice feature, so three models were run. One includes only people who
reenlist or separate; another includes only those who extend or separate. The
resulting equations for the first two models are shown below. Comparison is
between reenlistment to separation and extension to separation.
In (REENLIST/SEP) = a + a-X
In (EXT/SEP) = P + (3- X
where a and p are vectors of parameters and X is a vector of factors affecting
reenlistment and extension probability, such as pay ratio.
This method does not allow comparison of reenlistment to extension since the
samples for the two models are different. There are no reenlisters in the population
for which extension probability is estimated and no extenders in the population for
which reenlistment is estimated. To determine the effect of this problem, a third
model was run in which all candidates were included. Here the dependent variables
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dependent variables are probability of reenlistment compared to either extending
or separating, and probability of extension compared to either reenlisting or
separating. Perhaps because there were such small probabilities of reenlistment
and extension overall, 10.9 percent and 4.9 percent respectively, there was little
difference in the results.
The second method of analysis, model B, uses grouped data. Here,
reenlistment rates and extension rates are calculated for each of 44 cells. Four NEC
categories and 1 1 years of data allow simple regression of pay ratio against
reenlistment and extension rates.
For both models A and B, the pay and unemployment values are those in effect
during the year preceding the actual reenlistment, extension, or separation.
Although the ACOL model of choice makes sense, it is proposed here that choices
are made in advance of the actual contract expiration date, based upon conditions as
they are "now."
1. Model A: Individual Level Method
Parameter estimates of the logit model are presented below. As expected
there is a lot of unexplained variance in extension rate that is picked up by the
dummy variables for the years and by the unemployment rate variable.
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Table 13
MODEL A RESULTS (LOGIT)
REENLISTMENT EXTENSION
Variable (3 coefficient (standard error) p coefficient (standard en
PAYRATIO 0.38 (0.38) 0.79 (0.52)
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.37 (0.35) 3.23** (0.54)
AGE -0.08** (0.02) -0.09** (0.03)
MARRIED 0.55** (0.07) 0.45** (0.10)
FIRST-TERM -1.18** (0.08) -0.82** (0.11)
AFQT -0.004* (0.002) -0.01** (0.002)
EM -0.28** (0.09) 0.25* (0.13)
ET -0.10 (0.08) 0.15 (0.12)
ELT -0.32** (0.09) 0.46** (0.13)
1978 0.52 (0.77) 7.69** (1.23)
1979 0.84 (0.95) 9.20** (1.50)
1980 -0.22 (0.40) 2.06** (0.64)
1981 -0.06 (0.14) 0.27 (0.19)
1982 -0.39 (0.74) -6.30** (1.10)
1983 -1.83 (2.33) -21.26** (3.57)
1984 -0.40 (0.95) -8.37** (1.42)
1985 0.15 (0.18) -0.73** (0.23)
* = significant at .05 level
** = significant at .01 level
The coefficient estimates for pay and unemployment are positive, but not
significant. The sign of the coefficient on age indicates that older men, ceteris
paribus, are less likely to reenlist. This result is surprising. It is contrary to beliefs
that most analysts hold based on theory and on multiple sources of independent
evidence. The finding is less troublesome when one recalls that some of the impact
of age is captured in the coefficient on the first-term variable. This latter
coefficient has the appropriate sign. That is, it shows that ceteris paribus a first
termer is less likely to reenlist. Married members are more likely to reenlist, and
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men with higher AFQT scores are less likely to reenlist. EMs and ELTs have lower
reenlistment probabilities than MMs.
The effect of race on reenlistment was not determined because there are
too few non-whites in the sample population. Despite the Navy's affirmative action
goals, the fact is that a relatively smaller proportion of minorities are able to meet
the presently established AFQT score requirements to qualify for entry into
nuclear propulsion training.
Consideration of supervisory versus non-supervisory NECs was not
included in the model due to collinearity with the dummy variable for length of
service.
Extension is modeled only to account for the fact that it is an alternative to
reenlistment and separation. There is no attempt here to properly model the
extension decision, and as a result the parameter estimates should be viewed with
caution. Pay has a positive but insignificant effect in this model too, but
unemployment has a much stronger effect than in the reenlistment model.
Presumably this is due to the inability of the other explanatory variables to account
for the variance of extension rate. Extension decisions can be made for many
reasons, and clearly one is to wait for a bad civilian job market to improve. But the
extraordinarily high unemployment elasticity of 23.3 predicted by the extension
model is unrealistic.
2. Model B: Grouped Data Method
Initial attempts with model B were dissatisfying, but proper treatment of
the complex error structure eventually yielded good results. Ordinary least
squares regression using reenlistment rate as the dependent variable produced
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similar outcomes as for model A. The coefficient on PAYRATIO was positive, but
not statistically significant. Parameter estimates are presented in Table 14.
Table 14
MODEL B RESULTS, FIRST ATTEMPT
(REENLISTMENT)
Variable p coefficient (standard error) t-statistic
PAYRATIO 0.393 (0.242) 1.63
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.094* (0.035) 2.72
EM 0.019 (0.032) 0.60
ET 0.051 (0.042) 1.23
ELT 0.005 (0.026) 0.20
1978 0.100* (0.043) 2.35
1979 0.139* (0.051) 2.74
1980 -0.045* (0.017) -2.67
1981 -0.093** (0.032) -2.87
1982 -0.297* (0.121) -2.45
1983 -0.244 (0.115) -1.23
1984 -0.016 (0.030) -0.53
1985 -0.002 (0.017) -0.10
* = significant at .05 level
** = significant at .01 level
F = 7.468
R2 = 0.68
The first modification was to simulate a logit specification by the
transformation suggested by Hosek and Peterson [Ref. 31]. This involves creation
of new dependent variables
In (r/s) for reenlistment
In (e/s) for extension
where r = reenlistment rate
e = extension rate
s = separation rate = 1 - (r + e)
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This transformation allows use of ordinary least squares regression while
preserving the property that all rates sum to unity. It also accounts for the fact that
probability models are limited to the {0,1} interval, and so linear models are
inappropriate. The results of this model are not substantially different than the
first, however. (See Table 15.) Both F-statistic and adjusted R-squared values are
about the same, and only small changes are evident in the behavior of the NEC and
year dummies.
Table 15
MODEL B RESULTS, SECOND ATTEMPT
(REENLISTMENT)
Log Odds of Dependent Variable
Variable (5 coefficient (standard error) t-statistic
PAYRATIO 2.11 (2.60) 0.81
UNEMPLOYMENT 1.08** (0.37) 2.91
EM -0.06 (0.34) -0.18
ET 0.19 (0.45) 0.42
ELT -0.10 (0.28) -0.37
1978 1.24* (0.46) 2.71
1979 1.68** (0.55) 3.07
1980 -0.53** (0.18) -2.92
1981 -1.05** (0.35) -3.01
1982 -3.30* (1.31) -2.53
1983 -2.88* (1.23) -2.33
1984 -0.25 (0.32) -0.77
1985 -0.03 (0.19) -0.17
* = significant at .05 level




Some subtle problems with this type of time series cross sectional data
analysis have been noted. In particular, the ordinary least squares (OLS) technique
yields unbiased but inefficient estimators when the error term of the regression
equation is correlated among observations. OLS will yield efficient estimators
only if the errors among the four NEC categories in a given year are mutually
independent on all dimensions except those specified in the model, and if the errors
among all annual observations for an NEC category are also mutually independent.
For pooled time-series cross-sectional data, this assumption is erroneous and causes
an increase in the variance of the parameter estimates, leading to low confidence of
statistical significance.
Techniques have been developed to handle this problem. A SAS
subroutine called TSCSREG has been written which derives from a 1971 text by
Jan Kmenta [Ref. 37]. See Appendix B for details. Using the Parks method of the
TSCSREG subroutine, much better results were obtained. The Hosek & Peterson
transformations of the dependent variable were retained.
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Table 16
FINAL MODEL B RESULTS
(REENLISTMENT)
TSCSREG Procedure
Variable P coefficient (standard error) t-statistic
PAYRATIO 1.01** (0.103) 9.83
UNEMPLOYMENT 1.06** (0.068) 15.68
EM -0.16* (0.074) -2.13
ET 0.08 (0.099) 0.78
ELT -0.09 (0.135) -0.70
1978 1.22** (0.089) 13.77
1979 I 71** (0.104) 16.53
1980 -0.47** (0.038) -12.26
1981 -0.99** (0.064) -15.39
1982 -3.17** (0.229) -13.83
1983 -2.77** (0.226) -12.25
1984 -0.18** (0.063) -2.92
1985 0.03 (0.039) 0.80
* = significant at .05 level
** = significant at .01 level
Treating the error structure in the proper way results in great increases in
significance of the parameter estimates. The pay elasticity of reenlistment is
determined to be rj = 0.35.
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Some possibly critical assumptions were made in the construction of military
and civilian pay variables for these models. After success was achieved with model
B, a sensitivity analysis was performed. By changing the assumptions slightly, new
estimates were produced and compared to the estimates of table 15 above.
First and most important is the hypothesis that the nuclear industry pay data
used will perform better than aggregated and non-specific measures of alternative
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compensation for nuclear trained enlisted men. The TSCSREG procedure was run
with new PAYRATIO calculated using average weekly earnings in manufacturing
data published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This model produced a
substantially lower and barely significant parameter estimate for pay ratio. The
estimate was negative for the extension equation. The model as a whole performed
less well also; mean square error increased by about 10 percent.
The other critical assumption concerned overtime in the nuclear industry.
Removing the factors that increased civilian pay by 1.3 to 1.5 had the expected
effect of lowering the parameter estimates for pay ratio. The coefficient on pay in
the reenlistment equation fell by 32 percent, but the high statistical confidence was
retained. Thus this assumption is important to the magnitude of parameters and
elasticities, but not crucial to the general conclusions.
Finally, the three year reenlistment assumption was changed to four years; the
model was not sensitive to the change.
C. COMPARISON OFTHE MODELS
The most important result of this thesis is the determination of the influence of
pay on reenlistment. Table 17 summarizes the findings.
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Table 17
SUMMARY OF PAY ELASTICITIES
MODEL A MODEL B MODEL B MODEL B (final)
Logit OLS Logit Simulation TSCSREG
Pay Elasticity 0.16° 1.92a 0.95a 0.35
of Reenlistment
a = not statistically significant
The TSCSREG model is clearly superior, primarily because it was the only one
to estimate a coefficient of PAYRATIO with sufficient statistical confidence. It
provided uniformly more significant estimators for all explanatory variables.
The significance of dummy variables in the reenlistment equation is
interesting. The results can be explained partially by inspection of pay ratios and of
reenlistment rates during the period. Large military pay increases in fiscal 1981
and 1982 increased PAYRATIO for 1981 and 1982 candidates, while reenlistment
rates were lower than would have been predicted by the pay increases alone. Refer
to Figures 3 and 5 of the previous chapter. This is presumably due to a lag in the
effect of changing pay. Many individuals with 1982 ETS dates probably made up
their minds not to reenlist before the fiscal 1981 pay raise went into effect. Once a
decision like that is made, it is hard to reconsider. The 1981 pay increase probably
had much more impact on those who made reenlistment decisions in later years.
D. LIMITATIONS
Several limitations were encountered during the course of this research. The
most significant are described in this section.
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First, since the ORC surveys include only shareholder owned utilities, seven
public nuclear facilities are not included in the data. It is assumed that competition
in the industry will cause the pay rates at those plants to be substantially the same as
those found by the surveys.
Second, the treatment of Navy electricians (EMs) by this methodology was
imperfect. The relevant positions were taken to be control operator (E331) and
electrician (E414). The control operator job is most closely analogous to the Navy
job done by Electronics Technicians (ETs), but it is assumed here that at least some
electricians can qualify. Data is not available to assess the extent to which this job is
filled by non ETs. The assumption made by the data analysis here is that the pay of
EMs can be accurately represented by a weighted average of the two positions as
was done for the other three NECs. This may not be accurate.
Third, due to the method of counting reenlistments and extensions, there are
some unobserved decisions. Candidates who appeared in the data file of the
following year with the same ETS date were deleted from the analysis and there-
fore also not observed. These missing observations are assumed to be a random
sample of the entire population of candidates.
Fourth, the assumptions made in order to calculate salaries were imperfect.
Accumulating all the candidates into three military pay categories was simplifying
but inaccurate. Sufficient information is available to specify present military pay
precisely. Also, only current pay information was used. The ACOL framework
could have been employed to calculate present value pay comparisons for these
men. The method used here assumes a zero discount rate, which is obviously not
the case.
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Finally, the desire to use the same model for reenlistment and extension caused
improper specification of the extension equation, both due to the inclusion of the
bonus in calculation of military pay and due to exclusion of variables which are
uniquely relevant to extension such as gaps in SRB coverage and time of year.
Since the purpose of this thesis is to analyze reenlistment behavior, these
imperfections are not important.
The analysis herein could be refined by systematically accounting for these
limitations in a different way than is done in this paper.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis conducted for this thesis confiims the significance of pay in
reenlistment decisions. It also supports the hypothesis that unemployment has an
important impact on extension decisions. In addition, the age, family status,
AFQT, and time in service variables have significant impacts on reenlistments in
both cases.
The usefulness of sophisticated econometric techniques was also demonstrated.
Statistically significant results for pay effects were obtained only after taking into
account the cross-sectional and time-dependent correlations, and only after
allowing for heteroskedasticity that exist in data of the type used here.
A. COMPARISONS WITH PREVIOUS WORK
This study is distinct from other research focusing on "first-term" retention in
several ways. One difference is the time in service and age of those in the sample.
For many of these men, the first real choice to get out of the Navy comes at the 8
year point. Most studies consider the first term of enlistment to be four years. At
least one study omitted 6 year initial enlistments entirely.
l. Eay.
The pay elasticity of 0.35 uncovered by this study is significantly different
from those of most other similar research. Previous work has found elasticities
consistently greater than unity, with most around 2 to 3.
There are two possible explanations for this result. First, there is
evidence that more arduous occupations are less influenced by pay. People are
more influenced by other things when those other things are either very good or
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very bad. Warner and Goldberg, for example, found less elastic supply curves for
occupations where there was significant sea duty [Ref. 11]. Men on nuclear ships
spend a gTeat deal of time at sea; in general, the sea duty variable is a good measure
of how demanding a Navy job is.
Second, the level of pay ratios reported in this study differs significantly
from that in others. Most research has found relatively small differences in
military and civilian pay. But the men in this study can realistically expect to make
over twice as much money in the civilian nuclear industry as they can in the Navy,
even when reenlistment bonuses are included in Navy pay. Marginal changes in
pay ratio can be expected to have a much greater effect when the ratio is close to
unity than when it changes from, say, 0.48 to 0.50. In the former case, a military
pay raise or bonus multiple change might make the Navy more attractive
financially than the best civilian alternative. In the case of nuclear trained enlisted
men, military pay changes have almost all been of little consequence due to the
magnitude of the difference.
2. Unemployment
As expected, unemployment rate has a positive influence on reenlistment
rate. The magnitude of the effect on extension behavior, however, is unusual. The
elasticities determined here ranged from 12 to 23. The unemployment variable
ranges from 5.1 percent to 9.9 percent with a mean of 7.2 percent. Extension rates
range from 1.6 percent to 7.2 percent with a mean of 4.9 percent. Hosek &
Peterson's elasticity was 3.27 1 [Ref. 31]; the comparable method on the pooled data
1 Calculated from a first derivative of .0322 for the second term, defined as 6-9 years of
service.
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set used here produces a value of 12.34. This might be due to the relatively small
variations in the extension rates in these data. All the dummy variables for year
were also significant, implying an inadequacy of the other explanatory variables to
explain variance in extension rate.
B. FORECASTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Some projection can be done on the basis of the results of this thesis. Earlier
discussion presented the reduction of hiring and training costs as one of the values
of good retention. Due to their high "quality" (as defined by the Navy), nuclear
trained men are particularly hard to attract to the service. Many aspire to college
education and professional careers. On one hand, the academic nature of the
nuclear propulsion training is appealing to these men. On the other hand, many of
them tend to be dissatisfied with life in the enlisted Navy.
A more important aspect from the Navy's financial point of view is the cost of
that training. Nuclear training takes over a year, during which time members
receive full pay, allowances, and benefits. For a typical E-4, this amounts to about
$10,000 in basic pay alone. 2 Add to this the cost of operating and maintaining the
facilities and the costs of military and civilian staff at the training sites, and it is
clear that the investment in training is significant. The second phase of training in
particular is very expensive since it takes place at an operating nuclear prototype
plant which exists solely for training and research.
The prospect of spending up to $30,000 for a reenlistment bonus which will
avoid the necessity of recruiting and training a replacement is obviously appealing.
2 Based upon the FY 1988 pay tables.
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If present trends in pay continue, holding all other variables constant, the average
military to civilian pay ratio for this group will be 0.396 in fiscal year 1990. This
represents a decrease of 11.6 percent from the 1987 value of 0.448, and is
estimated to lead to a decrease in the average reenlistment rate of 4.1 percent. This
amounts to a change from 11.1 to 10.65 percent.
The pay increase necessary to recover the 1987 reenlistment rate would be
about $250 per month. This 13.2 percent increase in compensation could be
achieved by a basic pay raise or by increasing the SRB multiple by about 1 .5 points,
giving the average 3 year reenlistee an additional $9000. Such an increase would
require raising the statutory cap above $30,000. Note that the 13.2 percent pay
raise required is in addition to the annual raises already taken into account by
extrapolating the trend of the last few years.
The inelasticity of labor supply in this sector is detrimental to Navy efforts to
meet retention goals using financial resources. SRBs are clearly the most efficient
tool now available to maintain the status quo.
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WRITING DMDC DATA TO DISK FILE
//DMDC86D JOB ( 0529, 9999 ),' DC SAS',CLASS=C
//XMAIN SYSTEM=SY2
// EXEC SAS
//WORK DD SPACE=(CYL, (20,20))





IF DTRANKY=0 THEN DELETE,
IF DTRANKM=0 THEN DELETE,
IF DATENLY=0 THEN DELETE,
IF DATENLM=0 THEN DELETE;
IF ETSY=0 THEN DELETE;
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IF Y = 77;
DATA NEW77;
SET Y1977;
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DATA NEW8 4;
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WRITING ECONOMIC DATA TO DISK FILE






INPUT YEAR 1-4 UNEMPAG 6-9 .1
U M2024A 23-26 .1 U M2529
UWM2529A 38-41 .1 UBM2529
#2 CPAYE331 1-4 PREME331 6-8
CPAYE346 20-23 CPAYE349 2
CPAYE408 40-43 CPAYE414 4
#3 NUME331 1-4 NUME334 6-9
NUME346 16-19 NUME349 21-
NUME408 36-39 NUME414 41-
#4 EMSRBA 1-3 .1 EMSRBB 5-7
ELSRBA 17-19 .1 ELSRBB 21
MMSRBB 29-31 .1
#5 PSANE 1-6 .2 CPI 8-12 .1
BPAYE6 8 30-36 .2 BAQ5 38
#6 U M2024B 3-6 .1 U M2529B 8
UWM2529B 18-21 .1 UBM2529
#7 NP0331 3-6 VAC331 8-10 N
NP0349 21-24 VAC349 26-28
NP0390 39-42 VAC390 44-46
NP0414 57-60 VAC414 62-64
#8 NPOTRO 3-5 VACTRO 7-8 NP
#9 SEPAY5 9 3-5 SEPAY5 8 7-9
SEPAY5 5 19-21 SEPAY5 4 2
#10 SEPAY6 9 3-5 SEPAY6 8 7-9
SEPAY6 5 19-21 SEPAY6 4 2
UNEMPMEN 11-14 .1 MFGAWE 16-21 .2
A 28-31 .1 U_M3034A 33-36 .1
A 43-46 .1
CPAYE334 10-13 CPAYE343 15-18
5-28 CPAYE352 30-33 CPAYE390 35-38
5-48
NUME343 11-14
24 NUME352 26-29 NUME390 31-34
44
.1 ETSRBA 9-11 .1 ETSRBB 13-15 .1
-23 .1 MMSRBA 25-27 .1
BPAYE5_6 14-20 .2 BPAYE6_6 22-28 .
-43 .2 BAQ6 45-50 .2
-11 .1 U_M3034B 13-16 .1
B 2 3 — 26 1
P0334 12 : 15 VAC334 17-19
NP0343 30-33 VAC343 35-37
NP0408 48-51 VAC408 53-55
OTNL 10-12 VACTNL 14-15
SEPAY5_7 11-13 SEPAY5_6 15-17
3-25 SEPAY5_3 27-29
SEPAY6_7 11-13 SEPAY6_6 15-17
3-25 SEPAY6 3 27-29
LABEL PSAWE = 'PRIVATE SECTOR AVG WEEKLY EARNINGS'
CPI = 'CONSUMER PRICE INDEX'
BPAYE5_6 = 'BASIC PAY - E5 WITH 6 YEARS OF SERVICE'
BPAYE6_6 = 'BASIC PAY - E6 WITH 6 YEARS OF SERVICE'
BPAYE6_8 = 'BASIC PAY - E6 WITH 8 YEARS OF SERVICE'
BAQ5 = 'BASIC ALLOW. FOR QUARTERS, E5
'
BAQ6 = 'BASIC ALLOW. FOR QUARTERS, E6
PREME331 = 'PREMIUM FOR OCCUPATION 331'
CPAYE331 = 'CIV NUC AVERAGE MONTHLY PAY,
CPAYE334 = 'CIV NUC AVERAGE MONTHLY PAY,
CPAYE343 = 'CIV NUC AVERAGE MONTHLY PAY,
CPAYE346 = 'CIV NUC AVERAGE MONTHLY PAY,
CPAYE349 = 'CIV NUC AVERAGE MONTHLY PAY,
CPAYE352 = 'CIV NUC AVERAGE MONTHLY PAY,
CPAYE390 = 'CIV NUC AVERAGE MONTHLY PAY,
CPAYE408 = 'CIV NUC AVERAGE MONTHLY PAY,
CPAYE414 = »CIV NUC AVERAGE MONTHLY PAY,
NUME331 = 'NUMBER OF INCUMBENTS, OCCUP
NUME334 = 'NUMBER OF INCUMBENTS, OCCUP
NUME343 = 'NUMBER OF INCUMBENTS,
NUME346 = 'NUMBER OF INCUMBENTS,
NUME349 = 'NUMBER OF INCUMBENTS,
NUME352 = 'NUMBER OF INCUMBENTS,
NUME390 = 'NUMBER OF INCUMBENTS,
NUME408 = 'NUMBER OF INCUMBENTS,
NUME414 = 'NUMBER OF INCUMBENTS,
EMSRBA= 'ZONE A SRB MULTIPLE FOR


























ETSRBA= 'ZONE A SRB MULT FOR ELECTRONICS TECHS'
ETSRBB = 'ZONE B SRB MULT FOR ELECTRONICS TECHS'


















































ZONE B SRB MULT FOR ELTS'
ONE A SRB MULT FOR MACHINISTS MATES'
ZONE B SRB MULT FOR MACHINISTS MATES'
'AGGREGATE NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE'
•NATIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AMONG MEN'
AVG WEEKLY EARNINGS IN MANUFACTURING'
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AMONG MEN, 20-24 YRS'
UNEMP AMONG MEN, 20-24 YRS, LAG 6 MO.
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AMONG MEN, 25-29 YRS'
UNEMP AMONG MEN, 25-29 YRS, LAG 6 MO
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AMONG MEN, 30-34 YRS»
UNEMP AMONG MEN, 30-34 YRS, LAG 6 MO.
UMEMP RATE AMONG WHITE MEN, 25-29'
UMEMP FOR WHITE MEN, 25-29, LAG 6 MO.
UMEMP RATE AMONG BLACK MEN, 25-29'
UMEMP FOR BLACK MEN, 25-29, LAG 6 MO.
NUMBER OF 331 POSITIONS REPORTED'
NUMBER OF 331 VACANCIES REPORTED
NUMBER OF 334 POSITIONS REPORTED'
NUMBER OF 334 VACANCIES REPORTED'
NUMBER OF 349 POSITIONS REPORTED'
NUMBER OF 349 VACANCIES REPORTED'
NUMBER OF 343 POSITIONS REPORTED'
NUMBER OF 343 VACANCIES REPORTED'
NUMBER OF 390 POSITIONS REPORTED'
NUMBER OF 390 VACANCIES REPORTED'
NUMBER OF 408 POSITIONS REPORTED'
NUMBER OF 408 VACANCIES REPORTED'
NUMBER OF 414 POSITIONS REPORTED'
NUMBER OF 414 VACANCIES REPORTED'
IN TRAINING FOR REACTOR OPERATOR'
IN TRAINING FOR NON-LICENSED POSITION'
NUMBER OF VACANCIES TRO'
















E-5 WITH OVER 9 YEARS AT SEA
E-5 WITH OVER 8 YEARS AT SEA
E-5 WITH OVER 7 YEARS AT SEA
E-5 WITH OVER 6
E-5 WITH OVER 5
E-5 WITH OVER 4
E-5 WITH OVER 3






E-6 WITH OVER 8 YEARS AT SEA
E-6 WITH OVER 7 YEARS AT SEA
— E-6 WITH OVER
~ E-6 WITH OVER
-- E-6 WITH OVER
-- E-6 WITH OVER
6 YEARS AT SEA
5 YEARS AT SEA
4 YEARS AT SEA
3 YEARS AT SEA
CARDS;
1975 8.5 7.9 190.79 12.8 7.6 4.8 5.7 11.5
6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
163.53 161.2 573.90 632.70 656.10102.60 106.20
16.2 9.7 6.7 7.7 13.5
16 16 16 16 16 16 16
20 20 20 20 20 20 20
1976 7.7 7.1 209.32 10.4 7.0 4.4 5.3 10.4
6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
175.45 170.5 594.60 655.50 679.80 112.50 117.00
14.5 8.6 6.5 6.9 13.7
73
16 16 16 16 16 16 16
20 20 20 20 20 20 20
1977 7.1 6.3 228.90 10.0 6.0 4.6 4.6 10.8
1513 . 1265 1709 1767 1403 1445 1760 1498 1450
467 664 50 59 255 276 94 1437 1871
6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
189.00 181.5 631.50 696.00 721.80 124.20 129.30
14.6 9.0 5.7 7.0 11.4
16 16 16 16 16 16 16
20 20 20 20 20 20 20
1978 6.1 5.3 249.27 7.7 5.0 2.9 3.5 8.8
1657 . 1382 1872 1824 1512 1545 1716 1636 1548
549 818 49 94 273 351 104 1159 1504
6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
203.70 195.3 666.30 734.40 761.50 131.20 136.50
12.5 6.5 4.6 4.9 11.2
35 35 35 35 35 25 25
35 35 35 35 35 25 25
1979 5.8 5.1 269.34 7.8 4.6 3.8 3.7 8.4
1788 . 1512 2063 1977 1693 1625 2042 1654 1644
594 932 56 108 350 324 114 361 592
6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
219.91 217.7 713.10 786.00 814.80 140.40 146.10
10.2 6.4 3.9 4.4 11.4
35 35 35 35 35 25 25
35 35 35 35 35 25 25
1980 7.1 6.9 288.62 12.4 8.9 5.3 6.4 12.6
1941 . 1641 2265 2397 1865 1799 2307 1813 1824
775 1010 67 74 363 340 110 349 467
6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
235.10 247.0 796.50 878.10 910.20 156.90 163.20
9.5 7.3 6.4 6.1 11.2
220 220 220 205 190 185 175
255 245 235 225 215 185 175
1981 7.6 7.4 318.00 11.6 7.1 5.5 5.5 12.6
2217 186 1798 2592 2403 2077 1961 2065 1980 2005
734 1242 71 191 386 366 684 403 458
6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
255.20 272.3 927.90 1023.00 1060.50 179.40 186.60
15.0 9.0 6.6 7.1 13.7
220 220 220 205 190 185 175
255 245 235 225 215 185 175
1982 9.7 9.9 330.26 15.1 11.4 7.7 8.2 19.4
2492 254 1985 2766 2647 2299 2205 2269 2129 2243
794 1422 69 219 450 418 709 459 523
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
267.26 288.6 965.10 1063.80 1102.80 186.60 194.10
17.7 11.8 8.3 9.2 17.1
220 220 220 205 190 185 175
255 245 235 225 215 185 175
1983 9.6 9.9 354.08 14.2 10.0 8.1 8.7 21.0
2626 246 2130 2986 2887 2430 2375 2417 2300 2383
959 1698 83 290 524 619 882 500 684
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
280.70 297.4 1003.80 1106.40 1146.90 194.10 201.90
74
20.5 15.3 10.5 13.8 27.6
220 220*220'205 190 185 175
255 245 235 225 215 185 175
1984 7.5 7.4 374.03 11.1 6.7 5.4 5.6 15.1
2751 291 2230 2947 3063 2588 2467 2536 2340 2509
1017 1741 118 293 592 686 969 518 683
5.0 4.8 5.0 4.8 5.0 4.8 5.0 4.8
292.86 309.4 1044.00 1150.80 1192.80 204.90 221.40
14.3 10.6 8.1 9.8 17.3
1318 99 3305 283 1284 142 2301 221 2883 232 4123 458 1883 176
779 14 755 98
220 220 220 205 190 185 175
255 245 235 225 215 210 190
1985 7.2 7.0 386.37 9.9 6.8 5.4 5.8 14.2
2902 302 2386 3217 3256 2728 2602 2665 2548 2681
1098 1690 114 314 661 796 1077 606 771
4.0 4.5 4.0 4.5 6.0 4.5 4.0 4.5
299.09 322.2 1075.30 1185.30 1228.60 211.00 228.00
13.9 8.6 7.2 7.5 17.8
1654 193 3370 213 1335 105 2718 181 3298 210 4055 379 1891 104
553 3 412 40
220 220 220 205 190 185 175
255 245 235 225 215 210 190
1986 7.0 6.9 396.01 9.3 6.5 5.4 5.7 13.6
3011 381 2537 3406 3407 2859 2756 2790 2648 2786
1255 1990 139 371 729 952 1249 690 891
3.3 4.6 3.3 4.6 5.8 5.6 3.8 5.6
304.85 328.4 1107.60 1221.00 1265.40 217.20 234.90
12.6 8.3 7.3 7.3 15.8
1483 46 3667 190 1350 66 2835 166 3247 157 4451 177 2104 104
586 2 417 20
220 220 220 205 190 185 175
255 245 235 225 215 210 190
1987 6.3 6.3 406.81 8.4 4.6 4.4 4.7 10.9
3149 375 2603 36J4 3602 2954 2827 2866 2678 2763
1238 2279 156 330 838 1082 1381 1012 1218
3.2 4.7 3.2 4.7 5.7 5.4 3.7 5.4
314.38 340.8 1129.80 1245.30 1290.60 221.40 239.70
11.7 7.3 6.1 7.3 14.5
1620 43 3693 182 1473 62 3087 180 3225 111 3777 141 2159 77
461 7 407 31
220 220 220 205 190 185 175






COMBINING ECONOMIC NITH DMDC DATA
































































IF TIMELEFT LT -125 THEN DELETE;
IF YEAR GT 1900 THEN YEAR=YEAR-1974
;
IF TAFMS GE 48 AND TAFMS LT 60 THEN Y0S=4;
IF TAFMS GE 60 AND TAFMS LT 72 THEN Y0S=5;
IF TAFMS GE 72 AND TAFMS LT 84 THEN Y0S=6;
IF TAFMS GE 84 AND TAFMS LT 96 THEN YOS=7;
IF TAFMS GE 96 AND TAFMS LT 108 THEN Y0S=8;
IF TAFMS GE 108 THEN YOS=9;
DIFF=NETS-ETS;
IF DIFF=0 THEN SAME=1;
ELSE SAME=0;
IF DIFF GE 1090 THEN REENLIST=1;
ELSE REENLIST=0;
IF DIFF LT THEN OUT=l;
ELSE OUT=0;
IF DIFF GT AND DIFF LT 1090 THEN EXT=1;
ELSE EXT=0;
IF NETS*. THEN SEP=1;
ELSE SEP=0;
IF SEP=1 THEN CODE=0;
IF REENLIST=1 THEN CODE=l;
IF EXT=1 THEN C0DE=2;





CREATING NEW VARIABLES WHICH PUT 19XX SURVEY DATA
IN 19XX FILE










#2 NCPE331 1-4 PREME331 6-8 NCPE334 10-13 NCPE343 15-18
NCPE346 20-23 NCPE349 25-28 NCPE352 30-33 NCPE390 35-38
NCPE408 40-43 NCPE414 45-48
#3 NNUM331 1-4 NNUM334 6-9 NNUM343 11-14
NNUM346 16-19 NNUM349 21-24 NNUM352 26-29 NNUM390 31-34






1513 . 1265 1709 1767 1403 1445 1760 1498 1450
467 664 50 59 255 276 94 1437 1871
1977
1657 . 1382 1872 1824 1512 1545 1716 1636 1548
549 818 49 94 273 351 104 1159 1504
77 6.1 5.3 249.27 7.7 5.0 2.9 3.5 8.8
1978
1788 . 1512 2063 1977 1693 1625 2042 1654 1644
594 932 56 108 350 324 114 361 592
78 5.8 5.1 269.34 7.8 4.6 3.8 3.7 8.4
1979
1941 . 1641 2265 2397 1865 1799 2307 1813 1824
775 1010 67 74 363 340 110 349 467
1979
1941 . 1641 2265 2397 1865 1799 2307 1813 1824
775 1010 67 74 363 340 110 349 467
1980
2217 186 1798 2592 2403 2077 1961 2065 1980 2005
734 1242 71 191 386 366 684 403 458
1981
2492 254 1985 2766 2647 2299 2205 2269 2129 2243
794 1422 69 219 450 418 709 459 523
1982
2626 246 2130 2986 2887 2430 2375 2417 2300 2383
959 1698 83 290 524 619 882 500 684
1983
2751 291 2230 2947 3063 2588 2467 2536 2340 2509
1017 1741 118 293 592 686 969 518 683
1984
2902 302 2386 3217 3256 2728 2602 2665 2548 2681
1098 1690 114 314 661 796 1077 606 771
78
1985
3011 381 2537 3406 3407 2859 2756 2790 2648 2786
1255 1990 139 371 729 952 1249 690 891
1986
3149 375 2603 3634 3602 2954 2827 2866 2678 2763
1238 2279 156 330 838 1082 1381 1012 1218
DATA COMBO;
SET ALL1 .ALL5;










IF NEC=3353 OR NEC=3363 THEN EM=1
ELSE EM=0;
IF NEC=3354 OR NEC=3364 THEN ET=1
ELSE ET=0;
IF NEC=3355 OR NEC=3365 THEN MM=1,
ELSE MM=0;
IF NEC=3356 OR NEC=3366 THEN ELT=1;
ELSE ELT=0;
IF Y=76 THEN Y0=1;
ELSE Y0=0;
IF Y=77 THEN Yl=l;
ELSE Y1=0;
IF Y=78 THEN Y2=l;
ELSE Y2=0;
IF Y=79 THEN Y3=l;
ELSE Y3=0;
IF Y=80 THEN Y4=l;
ELSE Y4=0;
IF Y=81 THEN Y5=l;
ELSE Y5=0;
IF Y=82 THEN Y6=l;
ELSE Y6=0;
IF Y=83 THEN Y7=l;
ELSE Y7=0;
IF Y=84 THEN Y8=l;
ELSE Y8=0;
IF Y=85 THEN Y9=l;
ELSE Y9=0;
IF Y=86 THEN Y10=l;
ELSE Y10=0;
IF MARSTAT=2 THEN MARRIED=1;
ELSE MARRIED=0;






//PR0C72 JOB (0529,9999), 'COOK 649-3913 ', CLASS=G
//KMAIN SYSTEM=SY2
// EXEC SAS



























































INPUT Y 1-4 UNAGLEAD 6-9 .1 UNMNLEAD 11-14 .1 MLEAD 16-21 .2
U24ALEAD 23-26 .1 U59ALEAD 28-31 .1 U34ALEAD 33-36 .1
UWM59ALD 38-41 .1 UBM59ALD 43-46 .1
#2 U24BLEAD 3-6 .1 U59BLEAD 8-11 .1 U34BLEAD 13-16 .1
UMM59BLD 18-21 .1 UBM59BLD 23-26 .1
CARDS;
DATA SET HORK.UN_LEAD HAS 11 OBSERVATIONS AND 14 VARIABLES
THE DATA STATEMENT USED 0.10 SECONDS AND 54^K.
DATA C0MB04;
SET ALL.LASC0M3;
IF DIFF GT 725 AND DIFF LT 735 THEN AUT0=1;
ELSE AUTO=0;
IF EXT=1 AND AUTO=l THEN DELETE;
IF EXT=1 AND AUTO=0 THEN EXT1=1;
ELSE EXT1=0;
IF Y=75 THEN DELETE;
IF Y=87 THEN DELETE;
IF PAYGRD LE 5
IF PAYGRD GE 6
IF PAYGRD GE 6
IF PAYGRD LE 5
IF PAYGRD GT 5
THEN BASEPAY=BPAYE5_6;
AND YOS LT 8 THEN BASEPAY=BPAYE6_6
;
AND YOS GE 8 THEN BASEPAY=BPAYE6_8
THEN BAQ=BAQ5;
THEN BAQ=BAQ6;
AND YOS LT 5 THEN SEAPAY=0;
5 AND YOS LT 6 THEN SEAPAY=SEPAY5 3
IF PAYGRD LE 5
IF PAYGRD LE 5
AND YOS GE
IF PAYGRD LE 5
AND YOS GE 6 AND YOS LT 7 THEN SEAPAY=SEPAY5_4
IF PAYGRD LE 5
AND YOS GE 7 AND YOS LT 8 THEN SEAPAY=SEPAY5_5
IF PAYGRD LE 5
AND YOS GE 8 AND YOS LT 9 THEN SEAPAY=SEPAY5_6
IF PAYGRD LE 5
AND YOS GE 9 THEN SEAPAY=SEPAY5_7
;
IF PAYGRD GE 6 AND YOS LE 5 THEN SEAPAY=0;
IF PAYGRD GE 6
AND YOS GE 5 AND YOS LT 6 THEN SEAPAY=SEPAY6_3
IF PAYGRD GE 6
AND YOS GE 6 AND YOS LT 7 THEN SEAPAY=SEPAY6_4
IF PAYGRD GE 6
AND YOS GE 7 AND YOS LT 8 THEN SEAPAY=SEPAY6_5
IF PAYGRD GE 6







































































IF PAYGRD GE 6
AND YOS GE 9 THEN SEAPAY=5EPAY6 7;
IF NEC == 3353 OR NEC:: 3363 AND YOS LT 6 THEN SRDMULT:=EMSRBA
IF NEC = = 3353 OR NEC: = 5363 AND YOS GE 6 THEN SRBMULT:=EMSRBB
IF NEC= 3354 OR NEC:= 3364 AND YOS LT 6 THEN SRBMULT::ETSRBA
IF NEC: = 3354 OR NEC:= 3364 AND YOS GE 6 THEN SRBflULT:= E13RBB
IF NEC: = 3355 OR NEC:= 3365 AND YOS LT 6 THEN SRBMULT:=MMSRBA
IF NEC: = 3355 OR NEC: = 3365 AND YOS GE 6 THEN SRBMULT:=MMSRBB
IF NEC: = 3356 OR NEC: = 5366 AND YOS LT 6 THEN SRBMULT:: ELSRBA
IF NEC: = 3356 OR NEC = = 3366 AND YOS GE 6 THEN SRBMULT:=ELSRBB
SRB=BASEPAY*SRBMULT«3;
IF Y LT 80 AND SRB GT 15000 THEN SR3=15000;
IF Y GE 80 AND Y LT 84 AND SRB GT 20000 THEN SRB=20000;
IF Y GE 84 AND SRB GT 30000 THEN SRB=30000;



























CIVPAY = NUMERAT x 1.5 / TOT;
NCIVPAY = NNUMERAT x 1.5 / NTOT;
LABEL CIVPAY='WEIGHTED AVG OF NUC INDUSTRY MONTHLY PAY 1 ;





NCPAYMM=(NP2+NP8)X1 . 3/ ( NNUM3 34 HNNUM408 )
;






























































DATA SET W0RK.C0MB04 HAS 12955 OBSERVATIONS AND 211 VARIABLES.





4 CYLINDERS DYNAMICALLY ALLOCATED ON SYSDA FOR EACH OF 3 SORT WORK DATA SETS
DATA SET HORK.UN_LEAD HAS 11 OBSERVATIONS AND 14 VARIABLES. 404 OBS/TRK.




46 CYLINDERS DYNAMICALLY ALLOCATED ON SYSDA FOR EACH OF 3 SORT WORK DATA SET:
DATA SET WORK. COMBOS HAS 12955 OBSERVATIONS AND 211 VARIABLES. 26 OBS/TRK.




IF EM=1 THEN PAYRATIO=MILPAY/NCPAYEM;
IF ET=1 THEN PAYRATIO=MILPAY/NCPAYET;
IF MM=1 THEN PAYRATIO=MILPAY/NCPAYMM;




DATA SET W0RK.C0MB05 HAS 12955 OBSERVATIONS AND 228 VARIABLES. 24 OBS/TRK
THE DATA STATEMENT USED 6.79 SECONDS AND 608K.
DATA MULT_ALL;
SET C0MB05;
IF REENLIST=1 OR SEP=1 OR EXT1=1;
DATA SET WORK.MULT_ALL HAS 11830 OBSERVATIONS AND 228 VARIABLES
THE DATA STATEMENT USED 5.38 SECONDS AND 556K.
DATA MULTI_R;
SET C0MB05;
IF REENLIST=1 OR SEP=1;
DATA SET HORK.MULTI_R HAS 11245 OBSERVATIONS AND 228 VARIABLES.
THE DATA STATEMENT USED 5.17 SECONDS AND 556K.
DATA MULTI_E;
SET C0MB05;
IF EXT1=1 OR SEP=1;
DATA SET HORK.MULTI_E HAS 10538 OBSERVATIONS AND 228 VARIABLES.

















































EM ET ELT AFQT PAYLAG
Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9
LOGIST IS SUPPORTED BY THE AUTHOR, NOT BY SAS INSTITUTE INC.
6935 OBSERVATIONS STORED IN UTILITY FILE
FRANK E. HARRELL, JR. CLINICAL BIOSTATISTICS
BOX 3363, DUKE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, DURHAM NC 27710
THE PROCEDURE LOGIST USED 147.48 SECONDS AND 976K AND PRINTED PAGE 1
PROC LOGIST DATA=MULT_ALL;




EM ET ELT AFQT PAYLAG
Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9
LOGIST IS SUPPORTED BY THE AUTHOR, NOT BY SAS INSTITUTE INC.
6935 OBSERVATIONS STORED IN UTILITY FILE
FRANK E. HARRELL, JR. CLINICAL BIOSTATISTICS
BOX 3363, DUKE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, DURHAM NC 27710







//PROC71 JOB (0529,9999), 'COOK 649-3913 , CLASS=G
//XMAIN SYSTEM=SY2
// EXEC SAS






PROGRAMMING STEPS ARE THE SAME AS FOR THE LOGIT MODEL, BUT THE I
I













TITLE1 'COOK -- 649-3913';




EM ET ELT AFQT PAYLAG






LOGIST IS SUPPORTED BY THE AUTHOR, NOT BY SAS INSTITUTE INC.
6350 OBSERVATIONS STORED IN UTILITY FILE
FRANK E. HARRELL, JR. CLINICAL BIOSTATISTICS
BOX 3363, DUKE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, DURHAM NC 27710
















EM ET ELT AFQT PAYLAG







LOGIST IS SUPPORTED BY THE AUTHOR, NOT BY SAS INSTITUTE INC.
5643 OBSERVATIONS STORED IN UTILITY FILE
FRANK E. HARRELL, JR. CLINICAL BIOSTATISTICS
BOX 3363, DUKE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, DURHAM NC 27710







//MOD2D20 JOB ( 0529 , 9999 ), 'COOK 6 49-391 3 ', CLASS=C
//*MAIN SYSTEM=SY2
// EXEC SAS





3 INPUT OBS 1-2 Y 4-5 EM 7 ET 9 MM 11 ELT 13 R_E_RATE 17-21.3
4 EXT_RATE 23-27 .3
5 #2 YEAR 1-4 UNEMPAG 6-9 .1 UNEMPMEN 11-14 .1 MFGAIIE 16-21 .2
6 U_M2024A 23-26 .1 U_M2529A 28-31 .1 U_M3034A 33-36 .1
7 UWM2529A 38-41 .1 UBM2529A 43-46 .1
8 #3 CPAYE331 1-4 PREME331 6-8 CPAYE334 10-13 CPAYE343 15-18
9 CPAYE346 20-23 CPAYE349 25-28 CPAYE352 30-33 CPAYE390 35-3J
10 CPAYE403 40-43 CPAYE414 45-48
11 #4 NUME331 1-4 NUME334 6-9 NUME343 11-14
12 NUME346 16-19 NUME349 21-24 NUME352 26-29 NUME390 31-34
13 NUME408 36-39 NUME414 41-44
14 #5 EM5RBA 1-3 .1 EMSRBB 5-7 .1 ETSRBA 9-11 .1 ETSRBB 13-15 .1
15 ELSRBA 17-19 .1 ELSRBB 21-23 .1 MMSRBA 25-27 .1
16 MMSRBB 29-31 .1
17 #6 PSAWE 1-6 .2 CPI 8-12 .1 BPAYE5_6 14-20 .2 BPAYE6_6 22-28
18 BPAYE6_8 30-36 .2 BAQ5 38-43 .2 BAQ6 45-50 .2
19 #7 U_M2024B 3-6 .1 U_M2529B 8-11 .1 U_M3034B 13-16 .1
20 UNM2529B 18-21 .1 UBM2529B 23-26 .1
21 #8 NP0331 3-6 VAC331 8-10 NP0334 12-15 VAC334 17-19
22 NP0349 21-24 VAC349 26-28 NP0343 30-33 VAC343 35-37
23 NPO390 39-42 VAC390 44-46 NP0408 48-51 VAC408 53-55
24 NP0414 57-60 VAC414 62-64
25 #9 NPOTRO 3-5 VACTRO 7-8 NPOTNL 10-12 VACTNL 14-15
26 #10 SEPAY5_9 3-5 SEPAY5_8 7-9 SEPAY5_7 11-13 SEPAY5_6 15-17
27 SEPAY5_5 19-21 SEPAY5_4 23-25 SEPAY5_3 27-29
28 #11 SEPAY6_9 3-5 SEPAY6_8 7-9 SEPAY6_7 11-13 SEPAY6_6 15-17
29 SEPAY6_5 19-21 SEPAY6_4 23-25 SEPAY6_3 27-29
30 #12 YEAR 1-4
31 #13 NCPE331 1-4 PREME331 6-8 NCPE334 10-13 NCPE343 15-18
32 NCPE346 20-23 NCPE349 25-28 NCPE352 30-33 NCPE390 35-38
33 NCPE408 40-43 NCPE414 45-48
34 #14 NNUM331 1-4 NNUM334 6-9 NNUM343 11-14
35 NNUM346 16-19 NNUM349 21-24 NNUM352 26-29 NNUM390 31-34
36 NNUM408 36-39 NNUM414 41-44
37 #15 Y 1-4 UNAGLEAD 6-9 .1 UNMNLEAD 11-14 .1 MLEAD 16-21 .2
38 U24ALEAD 23-26 .1 U59ALEAD 28-31 .1 U34ALEAD 33-36 .1
39 UWM59ALD 38-41 .1 UBM59ALD 43-46 .1
40 #16 U24BLEAD 3-6 .1 U59BLEAD 8-11 .1 U34BLEAD 13-16 .1
41 UWM59BLD 18-21 .1 UBM59BLD 23-26 .1
42 #17 NOTHING 1
43 ;
44
45 IF Y=77 THEN Yl=l;
46 ELSE Y1=0;
47 IF Y=78 THEN Y2=l;
48 ELSE Y2=0;
49 IF Y=79 THEN Y3=l;
50 ELSE Y3=0;
51 IF Y=80 THEN Y4=l;
52 ELSE Y4=0;
53 IF Y=81 THEN Y5=l;
54 ELSE Y5=0;
55 IF Y=82 THEN Y6=l;
56 ELSE Y6=0;







































































IF Y=84 THEN Y8=l;
ELSE Y8=0;
IF Y=85 THEN Y9=l;
ELSE Y9 = 0;
IF Y=86 THEN Y10=l;
ELSE Y10=0;
IF Y=75 THEN DELETE



























CIVPAY = NUMERAT x 1.5 / TOT;
NCIVPAY = NNUMERAT x 1.5 / NTOT;
LABEL CIVPAY=' WEIGHTED AVG OF NUC INDUSTRY MONTHLY PAY';










BASEPAY=0.63X(0.79XBPAYE5_6 + . 21*BPAYE6_6 ) + . 37xBPAYE6_8
;
BAQ=0.63X(0.79XBAQ5 + 0.21*BAQ6) + 0.37XBAQ6;
IF EM=1 THEN SRB=( . 63*EMSRBA + . 37XEMSRBB )XBASEPAYX3,
IF ET=1 THEN SRB=( . 63*ETSRBA + . 37*ETSRBB) *BASEPAYX3,
IF MM=1 THEN SRB=( . 63XMMSRBA + . 37XMMSRBB) *BASEPAYX3,
IF ELT=1 THEN SRB=( . 63XELSRBA + . 37*ELSRBB)XBASEPAY*3;
IF Y LT 80 AND SRB GT 15000 THEN SRB=15000;
IF Y GE 80 AND Y LT 84 AND SRB GT 20000 THEN SRB=20000;
IF Y GE 84 AND SRB GT 30000 THEN SRB=30000;













IF EM = 1 THEN PAYRATI0=MI LPAY/NCPAYEM;
IF ET=1 THEN PAYRATIO=MILPAY/NCPAYET
;
IF MM = 1 THEN PAYRATIO = MILPAY/NCPAYMM;

















DATA SET WORK. RATES HAS 49 OBSERVATIONS AND 172 VARIABLES





































MISSING VALUES HERE GENERATED AS A RESULT OF PERFORMING
AN OPERATION ON MISSING VALUES.
EACH PLACE IS GIVEN BY: (NUMBER OF TIMES) AT (LINE) : (COLUMN)
.
5 AT 977:7 5 AT 978:7 5 AT 979:7
DATA SET WORK.H_P HAS 49 OBSERVATIONS AND 175 VARIABLES. 32 OBS/TRK.
THE DATA STATEMENT USED 0.27 SECONDS AND 560K.
PROC REG DATA=RATES SIMPLE;
TITLE1 'COOK -- 649-3913';
TITLE2 'FIRST MODEL B REGRESSION';
MODEL R_E_RATE EXT_RATE = PAYLAG
UNEMPMEN
Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9
EM ET ELT
;
ACOV AND SPEC OPTION ONLY VALID WITH RAWDATA
ACOV AND SPEC OPTION ONLY VALID WITH RAWDATA
THE PROCEDURE REG USED 0.23 SECONDS AND 952K AND PRINTED PAGES 1 TO 2
PROC REG DATA=H_P SIMPLE;
TITLE2 'HOSEK AND PETERSON TRANSFORMATIONS';
MODEL LOG_R LOG_E = PAYLAG
UNEMPMEN
Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9
EM ET ELT
ACOV AND SPEC OPTION ONLY VALID WITH RAWDATA
ACOV AND SPEC OPTION ONLY VALID WITH RAWDATA
THE PROCEDURE REG USED 0.24 SECONDS AND 952K AND PRINTED PAGES 3 TO 4






TIME SERIES CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSION
//TSCS13 JOB (0529,9999), 'COOK 649-3913 ', CLASS=B
//*MAIN SYSTEM=SY2
// EXEC SAS
//FT16F001 DD UNIT=SYSDA , SPACE= (TRK, ( 1 , 1 ) )
,











































































































































21 SEPAY6 4 23
ET 9 MM 11 ELT 13 R E RATE 17-21.3
NEMPMEN 11-14 .1 MFGAHE 16-21 .2
28-31 .1 U_M3034A 33-36 .1
43-46 .1
CPAYE334 10-13 CPAYE343 15-18
-28 CPAYE352 30-33 CPAYE390 35-38
-48
UME343 11-14
4 NUME352 26-29 NUME390 31-34
4
1 ETSRBA 9-11 .1 ETSRBB 13-15 .1
23 .1 MMSRBA 25-27 .1
BPAYE5_6 14-20 .2 BPAYE6_6
43 .2 BAQ6 45-50 .2
11 .1 U_M3034B 13-16 .1
23-26 .1
0334 12-15 VAC334 17-19
NP0343 30-33 VAC343 35-37
NP0408 48-51 VAC408 53-55
TNL 10-12 VACTNL 14-15
SEPAY5_7 11-13 SEPAY5_6 15-17
-25 SEPAY5_3 27-29
SEPAY6_7 11-13 SEPAY6_6 15-17
-25 SEPAY6 3 27-29
22-28 .2
PREME331 6-8 NCPE334 10-13 NCPE343 15-18
3 NCPE349 25-28 NCPE352 30-33 NCPE390 35-38
3 NCPE414 45-48
NNUM334 6-9 NNUM343 11-14
9 NNUM349 21-24 NNUM352 26-29 NNUM390 31-34
9 NNUM414 41-44
EAD 6-9 .1 UNMNLEAD 11-14 .1 MLEAD 16-21 .2
26 .1 U59ALEAD 28-31 .1 U34ALEAD 33-36 .1
41 .1 UBM59ALD 43-46 .1
.1 U59BLEAD 8-11 .1 U34BLEAD 13-16 .1
21 .1 UBM59BLD 23-26 .1
#17
IF Y=77 THEN Yl=l
ELSE Y1=0;
IF Y=78 THEN Y2=l
ELSE Y2=0;
IF Y=79 THEN Y3=l
ELSE Y3^0;
IF Y=80 THEN Y4=l
ELSE Y4=0;







































































IF Y=82 THEN Y6=l;
ELSE Y6=0;
IF Y=83 THEM Y7=l;
ELSE Y7=0;
IF Y=84 THEM Y8 = l;
ELSE Y8=0;
IF Y=85 THEM Y9=l;
ELSE Y9 = 0;
IF Y=86 THEN Y10=l;
ELSE Y10=0;
IF Y=75 THEM DELETE;



























CIVPAY = NUMERAT * 1.5 / TOT;
NCIVPAY = NNUMERAT ^1.5/ NTOT;
LABEL CIVPAY=' WEIGHTED AVG OF NUC INDUSTRY MONTHLY PAY';












21*BPAYE6_6 ) + . 37*BPAYE6_8
;
BAQ=0.63*(0.79*BAQ5 + 0.21*BAQ6) + 0.37XBAQ6;
IF EM=1 THEN SRB=( . 63*EMSRBA + . 37*EMSRBB)*BASEPAY*3;
IF ET=1 THEN SRB=( . 63*ETSRBA + . 37XETSRBB )*BASEPAY*5;
IF MM-1 THEN SRB=( . 63*MMSRBA + . 37*MMSRBB)XBASEPAY*3;
IF ELT=1 THEN SRB=( . 63XELSRBA + . 37XELSRBB )*BASEPAY*3;
IF Y LT 80 AND SRB GT 15000 THEN SRB=15000;


























































IF Y GE 84 AND SRB GT 30000 THEN SRB=30000;
MILPAY=BASEPAY + BAQ + SRB/36;
IF EM=1 THEN PAYRATIO=MIL PAY/NCPAYEM;
IF MM=1 THEN PAYRATIO=MILPAY/NCPAYMM,
IF ET=1 THEN PAYRATIO=MILPAY/HCPAYET ;




IF EM=1 THEN TSCS=1;
IF ET=1 THEN T5CS=2;
IF NM=1 THEN T3CS=3;
IF ELT=1 THEN T5CS=4;
CARDS;
DATA SET WORK. RATES HAS 44 OBSERVATIONS AND 173 VARIABLES. 32 OBS/TRK





LOG T=LOG((R E RATE+EXT RATE)/(1-R E RATE-EXT RATE));
32 OBS/TRKDATA SET WORK.H P HAS 44 OBSERVATIONS AND 176 VARIABLES
THE DATA STATEMENT USED 0.27 SECONDS AND 556K.
PROC SORT OUT=TSCSDATA DATA=H_P;
BY TSCS YEAR;
4 CYLINDERS DYNAMICALLY ALLOCATED ON SYSDA FOR EACH OF 3 SORT WORK DATA SETS
DATA SET HORK.TSCSDATA HAS 44 OBSERVATIONS AND 176 VARIABLES. 32 OBS/TRK.
THE PROCEDURE SORT USED 0.78 SECONDS AND 940K.
PROC TSCSREG DATA=TSCSDATA TS=11 CS=4 PARKS;
TITLE1 'COOK — 649-3913';










Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9
EM ET ELT







This appendix describes the fundamentals of the time series cross sectional data
analysis technique used to obtain the results of chapter IV. Refer to Kmenta [Ref.
37, pp.5 12-5 14] for details.
The ordinary least squares regression method relies on the assumption that
observations are mutually independent of each other. In a data set of the type used
in model B of this thesis, such an assumption is probably not valid. The Kmenta
text develops a model which takes into account the possibility of the most general
non-random error structure. Specifically, it allows for the following forms of the
disturbance term, e:
E(£u2) = cry (heteroskedasticity)
E(£it £jt) = <5ij (mutual correlation)
Eit = pi£i,t-i + uu (serial correlation)
It can be shown that this formulation results in consistent estimates of the
regression coefficients and their variances. In addition to performing the
transformations required for this specification and determining parameter
estimates and standard errors, the SAS routine TSCSREG prints the variance
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